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Resistance in the Philippines

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Introduction

One of the emerging priorities in post-development literature is the focus on 'new social movements' - particularly exploring how these groups respond to threatened livelihoods, and potentially articulate alternatives to traditional forms of development (Escobar 1995). Theorists have emphasised how many of these social movements are involved in conflicts over society's resources and inequitable developments, while struggling to overcome political and economic marginality. Glassman (2001) suggests that social movements are often concerned with opposing 'global neoliberal development practices'¹, and instead advocate for development initiatives which meet local needs and protect peoples livelihoods and environments. Nelson (2003: 562) notes that research has focused on 'social movements as counterpublics, as sites for the expansion of civil society and for the construction of 'new' social identities'. I seek to show the importance of 'new' identities which are emerging from spaces in Filipino civil society. These identities articulate potential alternative approaches to development, however my research shows that such values are not 'anti-development', but are part of it, questioning the form and direction of development in the Philippines (Rangan 1996).

This paper will evaluate how a peasant, social movement in Negros, Philippines mobilises individuals to engage with the government implemented - Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme (CARP). As the starting point of mobilising, this social movement constructs resistance identities articulated through civil society, which seek to shape and critique the performance of CARP. This example illustrates the complex relationship between groups in civil society and state processes of reform and development.

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme (CARP)

When the 'people power' revolt, called EDSA1² ousted the authoritarian, Marcos-led government in 1986 democratic spaces flourished, allowing peasant organisations and NGOs to demand 'genuine agrarian reform'. No issue better illustrated the inequality between the poor rural majority and the Filipino elite than the inequitable land ownership produced through both colonial and post-colonial processes. A Government survey in 1988 found that 60 percent of families involved in agriculture were landless, 26 percent owned under three hectares each, and less than 0.1 percent owned over a quarter of all land-holdings of 100 hectares or more (Pye-Smith 1997). To address this situation the new President Aquino-led government proposed the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme in 1988. This was intended to promote rural development and reduce poverty by redistributing land to landless peasants, thereby terminating feudal relationships and tenurial arrangements. It was believed that the re-distribution of land would improve national food production and distribution, improve access to farm supplies, capital and markets, and create political stability (De Leon 2000).

CARP involves distributing private and public agricultural land to tenant farmers and workers, with the provision of companion measures such as: credit facilities, education, and new social institutions to support beneficiaries. CARP works like a state-assisted mortgage, where agricultural landowners are required to surrender their land and receive market-value compensation from a Government bank. The peasant beneficiaries then pay the Bank back over thirty years. There are a range of complex laws designed to determine: the scheme of land acquisition, who the beneficiaries are, the amount of land they receive, and the price of the land (De Leon 2000). These details are the most important, and inevitably contested part of the programme, as landowners seek to retain their rights to land, and beneficiaries seek to assert their rights to it. CARP is essentially re-negotiating power relationships through the transfer of spatial ownership, thus it is not surprising the programme has proved contentions and prompted resistance from landowners and beneficiaries.

Problems surrounding CARP

While CARP sought to promote equitable rural development, the application of the programme has proved problematic. Government accounts of the programme are favourable, however it has been heavily criticised by many, due to under-funding and the numerous legalised loopholes which landowners use to escape coverage (Bello et. al. 2004). Negros based NGOs argue that 'CARP is useless because after distributing land the government stopped supplying support services, technology, tractors and education but still charged the beneficiaries high interest repayments' (pers. comm.). As a result many beneficiaries fail to make the adjustment to farmers and cannot meet land repayments. Because of these reasons, critics argue that there has been little redistributive reform or reduction of rural poverty (see Bello et. al. 2004 and Hirtz 1998).

The programme has performed the worst on the Island of Negros, where only 50 percent of targeted land has been distributed so far (Bello et. al. 2004). Negros has been, and is, the principle sugar growing region in the Philippines and also possesses the most inequitable distribution of land, the highest incidence of poverty and some of the poorest and most marginalised Filipinos (Lopez-Gonzaga et. al. 1993). The Negros sugar plantation industry has created extreme inequalities between landowners and sugar workers, threatened food security and spawned agrarian unrest (Yap 1998). The goal of distributing the remaining CARP land in this region by 2008 is complicated by many outspoken and powerful landowners, determined to hold onto their land. Ironically, some of these landowners are using CARP processes to evict potential beneficiaries from their land through landuse reclassification laws and firing farm employees from work, thereby making them ineligible.

¹ I use the term 'global neoliberal practices' in a rather broad and imprecise way in which peasant groups in the Philippines use it to refer to such policies as trade liberalisation, liberalisation of financial flows and investment, reducing government spending and regulation of business activities.

² EDSA1 is the name given to the 'people power' revolt which ousted President Marcos in February 1986. Kerkvliet and Mojares (1991: 1) describe EDSA1 as a concentration of events; 'the accelerating deterioration of Marcos's authoritarian government, widening and increasingly vociferous opposition to government, the snap presidential election campaign of December 1985-February 1986, a military mutiny, a People Power uprising in . . . Metro Manila, the flight of Marcos and company, and Aquino's assumption of the presidency'.

Resistance in Negros

In May 2004 I went to Negros for six weeks to talk to a number of NGOs involved in a peasant social movement which has mobilised to address peasant issues in the region - specifically CARP's poor performance. This movement is composed of a number of NGOs and peasant groups associated with the 'New Patriotic Alliance' - a coordinating body for 'progressive'³ NGOs. While in Negros I talked with NGO staff members, community leaders, and reform beneficiaries about their experiences of CARP, and landowners actions. I was primarily looking at the resistance actions employed by peasant groups in relation to CARP and took part in their protest marches, meetings, and education seminars.

A significant starting point of this social movement's actions involves organising individual beneficiaries into community based Associations so that they can assert themselves collectively. These Associations provide the platform from which to undertake resistance actions such as protest marches, land occupations, petitions and legal cases, media releases, actions within congress, and alternative development practices (such as communal, organic farming). While these collective actions are important, I want to elaborate on how the movement constructs an oppositional collective peasant identity.

Mobilising resistance identities

To organise Associations, NGO staff and community leaders undertake education and unifying programmes⁴ which draw on populist, historical, place-based narratives. They call these programmes 'consciousness raising' and 'decolonising the mind' as they are essentially about politicising peasant communities through education about historically exploitative power relations between peasants and landowners. Education is undertaken to change the paternal relationship or 'culture of patronage and indebtedness' between peasants and landowners. For example NGO staff argue that,

farmers may go to the landowner in the off season asking for food. The landowner will 'gift' them rice (which is not really a gift because it was probably deducted from their pay or denied through not paying benefits). But nevertheless the workers will be grateful and loyal to landowners (pers. comm.).

In response to these skewed socio-economic power relations NGOs have developed education programmes which focus on a range of issues (see Table 1 for an overview). These programmes cover: literacy, promoting the importance of land ownership, assistance in understanding CARP, promoting alternative Filipino histories, empowering people to assert their rights and improving agricultural practices.

Peasant groups promote the importance of land ownership, because they see it as a 'source of life and livelihood', and 'freedom from oppression' or a way to escape poverty (pers. comm.). As well as livelihood values placed on land, many peasants have sentimental, ancestral, and social networks which are inseparable from their homes and land. These values connect places through time with ancestors who have 'cleared the land and made it productive' (pers. comm.). In this way land is conceptualised as a physical space, and an historical set of economic and labour relations. These values placed on land define the goal of social action - acquiring land and avoiding eviction, while also providing the drive to struggle for this goal, and actually define the peasant identity by outlining the adversary - the landowner who may be a threat to accomplishing this goal. This common goal of land ownership constructs unity across the Negros peasant population. So although Associations possess different geographical and socio-economic characteristics, they are united by their efforts to resist eviction and obtain land through CARP.

Another significant way peasant groups construct a collective identity is by promoting 'alternative histories' to educate people about the various power relations surrounding them. For example, NGOs show 'the history of feudalism in Negros, and how the landowners have grabbed land and exploited workers' (pers. comm.). NGOs argue that current inequalities are not 'natural', but are the result of specific political and economic processes which have marginalised peasants. For example, they teach that land rents, where peasants pay 40%-70% of profits to landowners are unjust, and that farm workers deserve minimum wages which meet their basic needs.

These approaches teach peasants that they have 'rights to the land because their ancestors have slaved to make the land productive' (pers. comm.). Such narratives encourage peasants to reject the legal ownership of the landowner, by again, implicating the place-based labour of peasants to construct an alternative land rights discourse. Thus education seeks to make beneficiaries aware of the historical and current power relations surrounding them. Education also seeks to prompt beneficiaries to critically reflect on how these existing socio-economic relations contain oppressive, domesticating ideologies which under-value peasant labour and naturalise class inequalities, specifically the unequal division of wealth and land.

A component of 'alternative histories' involves outlining previous peasant uprisings and resistances, including the 1896 Independence movement and the infamous Huks⁵ who were involved in armed conflicts with repressive landowners and the Filipino military throughout the 1950-70s. These narratives draw on historical peasant identities, promoting the idea that through such struggles positive

³ 'Progressive' is a term used by the NGOs to describe those groups who would commonly be called left-leaning. Bello et. al. (2004: 76) note that organisations in this Alliance are generally associated with militant leftist politics and seek to capture state power to bring about equitable social reforms, adopting an 'expose and oppose position' rather than working with government.

⁴ To undertake education programmes NGOs send community organisers to live in haciendas and farming communities. These community organisers facilitate the organising of the Association, including: building meeting houses, electing community leaders and sorting out membership criteria, such as fees and expected behaviours. These facilities and networks are then used to further education. For example, one NGO runs monthly paralegal training days for Association representatives to report on the state of their communities land tenure under CARP and discuss the challenges and disputes they may be having with landowners or local government. These meetings serve a number of purposes. They supply legal advice about CARP and civil rights, a forum in which to plan protest marches, government petitions and media releases, and possibly most significantly - provide a space free from landowner and Government surveillance in which to strengthen solidarity and unity.

⁵ The Huks were a militant group of peasants who initially fought the Japanese and allied landowners during the second world war, who then became associated with the New People's Army in the 1960s which is the armed wing of the Filipino Communist Party (Dolan 2003).

changes have been made and that peasants are ‘part of the revolution’. By using narratives which focus on the structural conditions of inequality, a basis of collective meanings is created, which allow individuals to identify each other. This includes people within the movement – ‘exploited peasants’, while also constructing the adversaries – the landowners. These approaches illustrate Melucci’s (1996) idea that emerging social movements adopt the language of previous struggles and utilise cultural memories to construct identities. The usage of historical, revolutionary narratives draws on the ‘spirit’ of previous resistances to inspire people and serves to predict the effects of actions and ascribe agency – by emphasising that peasants *can* bring about change (see Routledge and Simons 1995).

These education programmes are important in facilitating the implementation of CARP. As one community leader asserted, through education ‘people wake up and know their rights and the procedures of CARP, for without NGOs help we would not have known our rights or been able to struggle’ (pers. comm.). Education programmes seek to re-colonise peasants’ minds, replacing old ways of thinking with a new awareness of power relations and actions to contest these. This reflects what Nelson (2003) notes in her research with a Mexican social movement, where respondents went through learning experiences and developed new political vocabularies and tools which sharply contrast with the way they had previously conceptualised political authority and their own role in politics. Peasant groups in Negros are partially operating as de-facto state agencies by providing education, however they also come into conflict with state institutions and landowners because they provoke peasants to question the legitimacy of the existing political-economic situation⁶.

Table 1: Overview of NGOs education programmes and narratives

Prioritise peasants rights to own land (defines the short-term goal of social action which has long-term implications)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Draws on neglected place rights • Landowners have historically exploited peasants labour • Peasants have the right to own land they work on
Promote ‘alternative’ Filipino histories	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Draws on historical Marxist/Filipino revolutionary narratives • Landowners have ‘stolen’ land from peasants • Landowners have perpetuated feudal land relations slowing rural development and causing socio-economic inequalities
Encourage collective action	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assert that peasants can bring about change • This change can only happen through collective action

Resistance identities and Development practices

The mobilising programmes previously described express ideas about rural development. For example, if a peasant community successfully gains land through CARP, NGO staff encourage them to set up organic farming co-operatives. The agricultural education given by NGOs teach peasant farmers to diversify their crops (particularly from sugarcane to other food crops) to meet immediate food needs and to sell in local markets. Peasant groups argue that organic agriculture prioritises local knowledge, seeks to protect the environment, and most importantly, frees peasant farmers from the international patenting of expensive seeds and fertilisers. Additionally, by diversifying food production peasant farmers escape global price fluctuations in sugar and no longer contribute to an international trade system which de-values their labour. Peasant groups argue that these agricultural practices seek to politicise peasant farmers and give them more control over what they grow, how they grow it, and ultimately see them become self-reliant and improve their standard of living.

Such priorities (small scale, co-operative run, organic farms) run counter to global agricultural trends of large, intensive, mono-crop plantations, and the associated push for global free trade and control and patenting of genetic material. In this way the collective identity being constructed by peasant groups is opposed to capitalist, ‘top-down’ development initiatives – instead encouraging peasant farmers to critically reflect on, and act to change their society to one which promotes their independence, and the environments upon which their livelihoods depend.

Conclusion

Peasant groups in Negros civil society are vital to complementing, critiquing and shaping the performance of CARP in the region. An important starting point of collective social action is the mobilisation of collective resistance identities constructed through education about historical peasant identities, and alternative histories. These identities are constructed from a limited number of context bound, socio-cultural narratives which challenge existing power relations between peasants and landowners. While these identities can be seen as a source of strength they can also become exclusionary, and exacerbate an already adversarial relationship between peasants and landowners in Negros, which reduces the possibility of compromise and negotiation.

⁶ The process of constructing resistance identities is not uncontested, as some landowners and government personnel employ identity labelling tactics and intimidation to discredit peasant identities and discourage participation in peasant groups. This is done by labelling them ‘communists’, ‘subversives’, ‘squatters’, ‘land-grabbers’ and ‘legal fronts of the New People’s Army’. These labelling tactics draw on a limited repertoire of context-bound historical communist identities, to position peasant NGOs as aligned with ‘rebels’ (see Somers 1994). They seek to construct peasant groups as violent actors deserving repression by state military.

The construction of peasant identities provides a platform for other actions such as changing sugar plantations to organic agriculture, political resistance in congress and the use of media channels to critique state-produced discourses on agrarian reform and development. Through these actions peasant groups seek to gain control of land and change both the agricultural landscape in Negros and skewed power relations between landowners and peasants. This example shows how groups in civil society are trying to change and direct the form of rural development through utilising a government initiated reform. It points to the importance of identity, and how the processes of articulating collective identities contain within them ideas about how development is understood and prioritised.

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Peace on a Plate: Aid, Local Communities & Reintegration in Timor Leste.

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Introduction

The reintegration of returnees is critical to the reestablishment of peace and stability following complex political emergencies (Eastmond & Öjendal 1999:54, Helton 2002:30, Wood 2001:47). If displacement has been the result of conflict, then the sustainable and peaceful reintegration of returnees must entail the reformation of relationships. The theory of developmentalism places the blame for conflict on the failure of governance. It is widely believed that only through reversing structural inequalities and adopting a representative democratic structure and a market economy, can future conflict and displacement be averted. The development of community-based organisations (CBOs) in post-conflict communities is a popular mechanism with aid agencies to strengthen the development of a democratic society.

This paper is derived from the author's work towards a Master in Philosophy. Research was carried out in Timor Leste in July/August 2004. Fieldwork was carried out in four rural sucos of central and eastern Timor Leste using cluster analysis. Ninety-seven semi-structured interviews were carried out with groups of returnees, stayees and community leaders in or near the homes of respondents. A Timorese translator/advisor supported the author to carry out this fieldwork. Interviews were also carried out with a number of aid agencies in Dili, which had operated programmes in the country between 1999 and 2004.

Complex political emergencies are characterised by high levels of civilian involvement. Communities are torn apart as neighbours, friends and families become involved in opposing political and military factions. While some people join militia forces or other armed groups, others will be victims of the violence, losing homes, livelihoods and sometimes their own lives or the lives of their loved ones. Opposing factions often use the forced migration of populations as a weapon of war in their struggle for power (Helton 2002:7). As the conflict abates, people from divided communities are often flung back together: forced to live side-by-side with former enemies. Struggling to cope with psychological and physical damage, the return of refugees may rekindle feelings of loss and anger. With high levels of distrust between the receiving population, internally displaced people, demobilised soldiers and returnees (Black & Koser 1999:11, Eade & Williams 1995:838), the possibility exists that returnees will ostracized or become targets of violence (Maynard 1997:207). This may in turn lead to ongoing violence (UNHCR 1997:143, Wood 2001:47). For these reasons, the re- of reintegration ought not imply a return to the past. Reintegration entails a new beginning rather than a return to an old order (Hammond 1999:229). The question which begs to be answered, is however, the beginning of what? What are the conditions by which returnees can peacefully reintegrate into their communities and what are the conditions by which stayees will allow returnees to peacefully reintegrate?

Since the early 1990s, developmentalism has become increasingly influential with donor organisations, academics and development organisations, in explaining the causes and remedies to complex political emergencies and refugee movements. Developmentalism explains civil conflict as essentially an outcome of political failure, which has resulted in inequality of opportunity, injustice, and poverty (Coletta & Cullen 2000:15). This linking of liberal democracy as a remedy to conflict first gained prominence with Boutros Boutros Ghali's 1992 "Agenda for Peace" and then was later expanded on in his 1994 Agenda for Development:

Democracy is the only long-term means of both arbitrating and regulating the many political, social, economic and ethnic tensions that constantly threaten to tear apart societies and destroy States. In the absence of democracy as a forum for competition and a vehicle for change, development will remain fragile and be perpetually at risk. (Boutros Boutros Ghali 1994:n122)

In the latter parts of the 1990s, democracy became a corner stone of the good governance agenda. It suggests that through the mediation of a democratic system, the diverse needs and desires of the population could be peacefully mediated (UNDP 1999:15). Theory and practice regarding the reintegration of returnees is informed by this understanding. Refugee movements are fundamentally attributed to the failure of governance. There is consensus within the various arms of the United Nations, the World Bank, most major INGOs and academic development literature, that reintegration is dependent on durable peace and prosperity. These, in turn are hypothesised to rest on the existence of representative government, the rule of law, a market economy, security and a strong civil society (Collier et al 2003, Keating 2003:175, Pugh 2000:4, Wood 2001:13).

Where conflict comes to an end, there is little desire by the international donor community to contribute to the restoration of a system that has been deemed responsible for its occurrence (DAC 1997:n187). Instead, the post-conflict environment is often seen as providing an opportunity to replace former leaders, institutions and structures with more democratic decision-making approaches (Maynard 1999:122). Aid agencies have sought to target their assistance in a manner that addresses what they perceive to be the root causes of the conflict, thereby preventing further outbreaks of violence and population displacement. The strengthening of civil society has thus become a popular goal with these agencies.

Community Based Organisations (CBOs)

External aid agencies often target their support of civil society into community-based organisations. These are associations of locally based people who work together to achieve some common aim. Where these groups are engaged in reconstruction or development work, they are said to enhance the environment of return, and support the social, economic and political reintegration of returnees (DAC 1997:n210).

Community-based organisations enable communities to direct their own development. With financial assistance and expertise from external organisation, CBOs are encouraged to use participatory and democratic decision-making structures to prioritise their problems and then seek and implement locally appropriate solutions (Cliffe et al 2003:2). To avoid exacerbating social divisions, sponsoring organisations usually try to ensure that they comprise a cross section of all parts of society, including minorities and the marginalised (Kumar 1997:177). Community based organisations are said to improve social relations between formerly estranged people and increase interpersonal and communal trust. They can provide a forum through which people are drawn together in cooperation on mutually beneficial projects, thus enhancing communication, reducing objectification of others and increasing interdependence and trust

(DAC 1997:n209).

CBOs are also credited with the ability to plant the seeds of participatory and decentralised governance (Cliffe et al 2003:3). Through articulating the interests of the grass roots, CBOs strengthen the development of linkages between the central government, local government and the community. They increase communication and create a more robust and responsive democracy that will enable people to mediate their differences peacefully (UNDP 1999:36). Furthermore, social networks that cut across societal groupings are alleged by academics such as Putnam, to contribute to the efficiency of institutions and positively influence economic development (Putnam 1993 in Coletta & Cullen 2000:7).

One of the major rationales for the support of CBOs is the developmental impact said to be achievable through the empowerment of communities. When communities lead their own development, it is said that they will instigate projects that reflect people's real needs more closely than those identified by external agencies. CBOs enjoy a greater degree of flexibility than externally based organisations and are able to sensitively respond to each locality's individual reconstruction and rehabilitation needs (Ballard 2002:65). CBOs are also attributed a role in operating services that neither the state nor the market are willing or able to provide (UNDP 1999:16, World Bank Group 2004). The ability of CBOs to meet communities' real needs is claimed to lead to greater project sustainability and thus increased benefit. The sense of local ownership is also alleged to reduce the risk of the project outcomes being damaged should violence resume (Cliffe et al 2003:3). In post-conflict societies, CBOs have reconstructed damaged infrastructure such as schools, roads and irrigation systems, redeveloped locally based services such as electrification schemes and assisted in the development of vocational training programmes.

Community based organisations also provide an answer to criticisms that aid encourages a culture of dependence. Instead, locally based organisations encourage communities to help themselves (DAC 1997:n210). The use of local labour and resources makes projects more cost effective than those constructed for external agencies (Cliffe et al 2003:4). The wide participation of community members is also claimed to reduce the risk of corruption, and organisations are likely to operate in a transparent, efficient and accountable manner (DAC 1997:n123). The reconstruction of damaged or destroyed resources enables people to begin their economic activity and restores a sense of normality. Where people receive financial compensation for their labour, the cash injection may trickle down into other sectors of the economy (DAC 1997:n215).

Background

Timor Leste provides a valuable test case of the effect that externally supported CBO can have on the reintegration of returnees. The country, then a part of the Republic of Indonesia, experienced widespread violence from early 1999 in the build up to a popular vote regarding the territory's independence. In an attempt to intimidate the population into remaining a part of the Republic, the Indonesian armed forces and pro-Indonesian militia groups mounted a campaign of violence and intimidation. This culminated in the sacking of the country and the displacement of almost the entire population, following the announcement in September 1999 that the population had overwhelmingly voted for independence. Two thirds of the population were internally displaced and over 250,000 refugees fled or were forced out of the territory into neighbouring West Timor (Dunn 2002:66, Martin 2001:81). With the return of the United Nations in late September, 125,000 refugees soon returned. Another 100,000 refugees have trickled back more slowly over the last five years (La'o Hamutuk 2003:10). Most people who stayed in Timor Leste in 1999 were supporters of independence, but the refugees included independence supporters, low level militia, their families and militia leaders accused of serious human rights abuses. Return for many of the refugees has therefore entailed not only economic and political reintegration, but also social reconciliation.

The situation in Timor Leste was of interest to a number of donor countries and international institutions. Aware of the value of the country managing a successfully transition to democracy and hoping to avoid further instability in the region (Clarke 2003:5), these actors poured substantial quantities of foreign aid into the territory, exceeding the amount per capita received over the equivalent period in Bosnia, the West Bank, Afghanistan or Rwanda (Bennet 2003:2). Relief, reconstruction and development were to be an immense task. Not only had the country been devastated during the pre- and post-ballot violence, it had previously been the poorest province in Indonesia (UNDP 2002:57), with little economic base, a poorly educated population and few people with the skills and experience to bring to the management of the territory (UNDP 2002:11).

Aid agencies became involved in the distribution of building materials and shelter kits, the provision of food and the repair of roads, schools, water pipes and other infrastructure. Although the need was recognised for returnees to be able to peacefully reintegrate, most international agencies timetabled their activities around a relief-development framework where the first two years of emergency relief were then succeeded by development programming. This changeover also saw the departure of some of the relief focused INGOs and the winding back of many of the UN agencies.

The reconstruction timetable did not however coincide with the repatriation of refugees from West Timor. At the end of 2001, approximately 68,000 refugees remained in exile while another 40,000 repatriated over the following two years (La'o Hamutuk 2003:10). By this stage, aid agencies and the United Nations had begun to scale back their programmes. Relief efforts were phased out or their functions taken over by state run organisations and a reduced number of development organisations.

The Development of Community Based Organisations in Timor Leste

The importance of community based organisations in post-conflict Timor Leste was highlighted in the early days of the emergency by a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) of multi-lateral development banks, five United Nations agencies and several donor countries (JAM 1999:n6). The JAM assessment noted the need to establish representative and participative community based institutions to fill the administrative vacuum left by the departing Indonesians. These organisations were to be charged with representing community priorities, resolving local conflicts and delivering small community development programmes (JAM 1999:n21).

A number of programmes were rapidly established across the country that supported the development of community based relief and development organisations. The World Bank instigated a US\$18 million Community Empowerment Project (CEP), and the

International Organisation for Migration, the Asian Development Bank and several INGOs also followed suit, implementing reconstruction and development schemes, which operated according to the principles of community-based development. Although only the UNHCR was particularly concerned with the reintegration of returnees, all organisations' civil society and CBO support programmes operated according to peace building principles, of which returnee reintegration is an important component.

The Timorese people were generally keen to participate in the aid sponsored CBOs, anticipating some immediate material benefit. They were usually established following a visit from the sponsoring agency. Agency staff met with local leaders, and then provided a workshop for community members explaining the form and functioning of the envisioned CBO. CEP, which was the largest of all the programmes, had established 417 village-level development councils and 60 sub-district-level councils across the country by December 2000. These groups oversaw the development of over 600 small infrastructure and development projects (La'o Hamutuk 2000:6). This early uptake however masked the many problems that beset almost all of the aid sponsored CBOs.

Few of the community based organisations managed to gain local legitimacy. This was due in part, to the manner in which the CBOs were instigated. Unlike traditional consensual-style community structures, members were elected to form a council. Several sponsoring agencies specified that committee members could not include traditional or former leaders. This put a group of people into leadership positions that held neither respect nor influence in their communities.

External agencies also provided insufficient levels of ongoing support. Although there was an awareness of the high levels of illiteracy and lack of formal organisational experience of most Timorese, there seemed to have been an expectation that the adoption of pseudo-Frierian empowerment and large cash inputs would replace the need for long term support and a partnership of mutual learning. There was also little acknowledgement of the effect that the years of occupation and fighting had on social dynamics and the low levels of trust within communities.

Operating in a manner antithetical to customary norms, the CBOs were often expected to become involved in activities that had not traditionally been in the domain of civil society. Furthermore, committees in particular, and often CBO members were expected to work voluntarily for the benefit of their communities. These forms of civil society were far removed from any form of organisation that people had formerly experienced and consequently there was little sense of local ownership or concern about the long-term outcomes of the projects. Endowed with comparatively large budgets, lacking local legitimacy and run by volunteers, in hindsight, it is not difficult to conclude that the externally instigated CBOs had adopted a recipe for disaster.

The CBOs did however achieve some success. They were especially proficient in short-term projects that oversaw the reconstruction of infrastructure. Communities were quickly able to realise the results of their work, utilising the roads, waterways, bridges and other facilities for economic and social activities. In the majority of cases, once built, community structures (usually not the CBO) maintained and where necessary, controlled their use. Reconstruction also had a psychological benefit, removing a physical reminder of the damage that militia-associated returnees had been responsible for.

As a part of the infrastructure repair, the CBOs achieved success in organising people into work teams. This was particularly the case when people were paid or otherwise compensated for their labour. Generally everybody who had returned by the time of the project's operation received a small amount of work through the schemes. The only people who were likely to be excluded from participation were former militia, who, in their fear of retaliatory attacks, observed a self-imposed exile.

Unfortunately, people's eagerness to work was driven by the need to obtain income rather than a concern with the CBO's success. One attempt to develop terraces and teach villagers how to grow pineapples was indicative of the problems that occurred with many programmes. A participant from an INGO sponsored CBO commented:

The terraces we constructed were never used because the organisation didn't come back; the pineapples we planted didn't fruit because we'd been told to plant them in the wrong season but because we received rice in exchange for our labour, nobody minded too much.

Needs prioritisation by communities appeared to be an ineffective way to identify projects however further investigation revealed that much of the participation was little more than lip service to the tenets of participatory planning. While some residents were ostensibly involved in planning, more often, organisations would come to a site with a pre-packaged programme and participation was confined to allowing CBO members to say "yes we want it" or "no, we don't". Most people interviewed said they had never been involved in community consultations, nor had they taken any part in the planning or formal evaluation of projects. Their participation was usually in the form of labour, either paid or voluntary.

Despite claims that projects were accountable to their beneficiaries, as in the Indonesian period accountability moved upwards; this time to foreign aid donors rather than the state. One former facilitator from one of the programmes claimed, "It wasn't really participation - we had to dance to the music - follow the money. We had to follow the [agencies'] priorities rather than the people's".

In other instances, the converse happened, with external agencies taking no role in influencing the choice of projects that CBOs undertook. In one sub-district, rather than using their funds to instigate development projects, the CBOs purchased a single plastic chair for each household. This was widely seen as an astute decision by community members because everybody received an equal amount and they were not required to contribute any further labour, or depend on other CBO members over the long term. CBO members opined that the chairs' owners might rent their chair for profit at parties in the village, and perhaps earn a dollar or two per year.

The years of Indonesian occupation and the conflict of 1999 have resulted in high levels of jealousy and distrust within communities. People look after their own interests first and expect others to do the same. The lack of trust people had in each other meant that they

were unlikely to contribute to programmes that required ongoing cooperation over the long term. This was particularly the case when participants feared that others could freeloader off their efforts.

Some CBOs did achieve a degree of longevity, but these tended not to be those instigated by foreign agencies. Instead they tended to be self-formed and were directed by respected local leaders. The majority of these groups had been established prior to 1999 and people shared a relationship of working together for mutual benefit. All members were clear on the function of the group and were able to explain how their participation benefited them personally. Several of these groups established relationships with non-governmental organisations, international non-governmental organisations and other agencies. This enabled them to access resources, training and capital beyond what they may have been able to as individuals. Generally group members were on similar sides of the political spectrum in 1999 and held a degree of trust in each other.

The operational structure of these CBOs reinforced the interdependence of group members. There was little sense of volunteerism and instead, groups operated in a manner that reduced the risk of a core group of members carrying others. In weaving collectives, women sold and profited from the sale of their own goods only; in agriculture groups, to obtain the labour of others, it was necessary to work for others or pay them for their labour. CBOs, that did not achieve reciprocal personal benefit for effort, failed to take hold. Women's agricultural groups folded because women preferred to work on family owned plots of land rather than in co-operatives; community operated electrification schemes collapsed when the management committee sold off the diesel for personal gain rather than volunteering for the good of the community.

Following the collapse of the externally initiated CBOs, equipment was divided up among group members or pocketed by the most powerful group member. This researcher saw a sewing machine sitting in the home of a leader from the local women's organisation - she had also managed to acquire the terraces built for the benefit of all women's organisation members. In another instance, the village chief had acquired all the concrete and timber from an incomplete building project.

Community Based Organisations and the Reintegration of Returnees

Community Based Organisations achieved mixed results in contributing to the reintegration of returnees. Over the period of study, neither the aid instigated CBOs, nor the self-formed groups bridged gaps between formerly antagonistic parties. While returnees and stayees did work together; separation in the majority of cases had not been due to estrangement, but due to forcible displacement. In the case of communities where former militia and independence supporters lived alongside each other, the creation of CBOs did little to bring people together. The immediacy of the violence and the ongoing hurt stopped people from willingly associating with those who were still considered enemies. The short life span of most CBOs also prevented many of the returnees from participating alongside stayees in their activities. As such, the CBOs were unable to bridge gaps between divided groups within society or directly contribute towards community level reconciliation.

The thesis tested the hypothesis that CBOs could enhance reintegration through strengthening local level democratisation. Efforts by aid agencies to provide the seeds of democratic practice generally failed to take root at the CBO level. This can be partially attributed to the short-term nature of most of the external support provided. Difficulties were further exacerbated by the differences in experience and expectation between rural Timorese and foreign aid organisations. Their failure to achieve any longevity precluded the organisations from contributing to the mesh of civil society organisations or enhancing the robustness and responsiveness of governance systems. It may in fact have caused an effect contrary to that desired by the aid community, reinforcing to the Timorese, the necessity of the state leading all development efforts.

The research also queried the ability of aid instigated CBOs to identify and implement programmes which met the needs of their community. The time bound nature of the programmes that aid agencies operated under, prevented them from genuinely building the local capacity of individuals to mobilise their communities. The expectation that people would voluntarily commit to projects that they would not personally benefit from was an unrealistic expectation in the post-conflict climate. People who were trying to pull their lives together were unlikely to refuse the opportunity to obtain anything that could contribute to their short-term welfare. This extended to the immediate benefits to be gained from inclusion in CBOs. It did not necessarily follow however, that participants were committed to the programme's long term functioning or had internalised the fact that, unlike in the Indonesian period, it would require either cash payments or the contribution of free labour for its ongoing existence. As such, most CBOs failed to contribute to the reintegration of returnees, but neither did they contribute to the well-being of people who had stayed.

The greatest impact that CBOs had on the reintegration of returnees was their effectiveness in rebuilding much of the damaged infrastructure. In cases that returnees arrived too late to benefit from the employment offered by these projects, they still benefited from the rehabilitation of roads, waterways, schools and market places. This assisted in recreating a sense of normality; it removed a visual scar of the violence and enabled people to begin their economic and social activities once again. Through reducing people's vulnerabilities, CBOs were able to impact the willingness of people to coexist with former adversaries. Through increasing people's agricultural productivity and boosting people's ability to access assistance and resources, the work of CBOs may have played a role in reducing tensions, particularly where the aid assisted people who had been victims of the destruction and violence of the militia forces. This may have decreased the level of physical violence and social ostracism to which returning militia associates were subject.

Conclusions

Community based organisations do not provide a miraculous cure to healing the wounds of conflict, building peace and enabling people to live side by side once again. In Timor Leste, the formation of CBOs did assist in removing some of the sources of anger against militia-associated returnees and enabled individuals to access assistance and resources that have enhanced their income generating potential. That said, many of the larger claims made regarding the benefits of CBOs as mechanisms to solidify peace and produce a conducive environment for reintegration remain unproven. In the short period that the majority of aid organisations actively supported

the development of CBOs in rural communities, they were not able to significantly lift the capacity of CBOs. The CBOs did not manage to strengthen the bonds between formerly opposed individuals or between individuals and the state. Neither were they able to mobilise communities to direct their own long-term development. Efforts may have been more successful had aid agencies had focused on working slowly and intimately with communities, developing structures and functions that were valued and meaningful to the participants.

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Churches and the National Economy of Samoa: Preliminary Analysis

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Introduction

Since Christian churches commenced work in Samoa in the early 19th century, they have achieved a central place in Samoan society. The Methodists commenced evangelical work at Satupa'itea in Samoa in 1828, the London Missionary Society established a mission at Sapapali'i in Samoa in 1830, and Roman Catholic presence was established in Apia in 1845. Conversions from a polytheistic pre-contact religion to a monotheistic one were rapid and complete by the early 1850s, and early work by these three denominations ensured that they became, and remain, the largest and most powerful denominations in Samoa. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints established a mission in 1885; the Seventh Day Adventist church established a presence in around 1897 and a number of evangelical groups, such as the Assembly of God, have become established since the Second World War. The dramatic conversions achieved early by the LMS, Methodist and Roman Catholic churches established a central place for them in Samoan society, and later arrivals have, until recently, made only limited inroads into the support of these 'mainstream churches'. (See Table 1).

The 2001 Samoan Census reveals that 99.5% of Samoans report nominal adherence to one or other of the Christian denominations, as one would expect in a nation whose motto is, 'Samoa is founded on God' (*Fa'avae I le Atua Samoa*). For most, however, commitment to their churches is real and intense, and is reflected in the high levels of attendance at church services, participation in church-related activities, and in various forms of support for the churches' work. While the Christian religion is extremely important to individuals, the churches also play a central role in the social, political, educational and economic life of Samoa. The close and public commitment of senior matai, politicians and civil servants to the churches ensures a great deal of secular awareness of and political support for the churches' aspirations. The widespread and intense commitment to Christian religion, and to religious values, has certainly been a major factor in the social and political stability which has characterised Samoa since its independence in 1962 and has shaped the character of much legislation.

This paper makes no comment on these issues, and focuses instead on the calculation of the value of support which Samoans give to the church as an expression of their commitment to religious faith and on its possible significance for the trajectory of economic development in general, and of village economic development in particular. This interest arose from observation that friends and relatives had a number of ideas about, and plans for, new agricultural projects and small businesses which they claimed they were unable to start, and in some cases to run, because of their financial commitments to their churches. These claims made intuitive sense. The money contributed to churches in Samoa effectively reduces the working capital available to individuals', families' and villages'; limits their ability to accumulate private capital for economic investment, and to acquire assets which might be used as collateral for loans. This, in turn, limits the range and scale of economic investment options which are available to them. This trend, in turn, has a consequence for the trajectory of development of the national economy. This led us to consider how much was 'extracted' from the village economy, and what difference that might make if it were retained in the village.

We had assumed that these figures would be readily available in either in research studies or in government documents. A review of studies turned up only two early estimates: Lockwood's 1970 study of 4 villages provided figures for cash contributions [Lockwood, 1971], and Pitt's 1970 3 village study contained estimates of the numbers of hours of work provided to the church by members in those villages [Pitt, 1970]. Other studies, including a number by Samoan economists, who might have been expected to be aware of and interested in these figures, either conflated contributions to church and customary obligations, or more recently, have focused on the macro-economy and macro-economic settings. That discovery, in turn, led us to consider how we might calculate the value of contributions made to the church, and the consequences of these patterns of giving for individuals, villages and for the nation. The first part of this paper focuses on the issues around the calculation of the amount, and the second part focuses on the possible consequences for the individuals and for the nation.

Estimating the Churches' Impact on the National Economy

The impact of the church can be divided into direct influences, which include such things as the amount of money and value of goods and services which adherents contribute to the church, and indirect impacts such as the loss to the national economy of foregone taxation, reduced levels of domestic savings, non-availability of domestic investment capital, and the costs of borrowing abroad to finance certain forms of expenditure. To understand the extent of the impact, it is necessary to identify the various components of contributions to churches, and then to estimate the value of these.

These values are more easily calculated for some denominations than for others. The Congregational Christian Church of Samoa¹, the Methodist Church of Samoa² and more recently the Roman Catholic Church, have routinely made public the amounts collected by the church both as regular 'freewill offerings' or *alofa*, special offerings, *taulaga*, such as those around Christmas, and collections for special purposes such as missionary activity. These total amounts, and the contributions of individuals, are normally read out during the service and are a matter of public knowledge and record. Indeed, congregations' generosity, as measured by these contributions, have become proxy indices of villages' religious commitment and wealth. It is, therefore, relatively easy to collect data from these congregations.

Other denominations treat the giving of members as a matter of personal conscience and do not reveal their members' contributions publicly. These are the 'tithing churches' which include the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, the Seventh Day Adventists and smaller churches such as the Apia Protestant Church. These denominations which are parts of global churches also receive various forms of support from these 'parent churches' which relieves the pressure on local adherents to fund large and expensive local projects.

¹ This denomination is formally known in Samoan as the Ekalesia Fa'apopotoga Kerisiano Samoa (EFKS), and colloquially as the L.M.S or Lotu Ta'iti.

² This denomination is known in Samoan as the Lotu Metotisi, and colloquially as the Lotu Toga.

These ‘transfers’ occur in such areas as the churches’ building programs, the provision of secular education, and the training of the pastorate but their values are not routinely made public.

The same is true of contributions made to the annual cycle of special collections and those made to extraordinary collections for such things as building programs. When, for instance, mainstream village congregations build churches, part of the labour requirement and the funds³ are raised in the village, from expatriate villagers abroad through *tusigaigoa*, and gifts made by invited guests (*ta’alolo*) on the opening day (*fa’aulufalega*). These funds are periodically accounted for publicly and are well understood⁴. In other churches, such as the L.D.S, local building funds are provided privately by members of congregations and are supplemented by subsidies from parent churches abroad and so the costs of building are not born entirely by local populations and are not as widely available.

This complicates the problem of calculating the value of local contributions to this activity. For the purposes of calculation it is fortunate that the majority of the adult population belongs to ‘mainstream churches’. This has shaped our approach to calculation in this preliminary paper. Rather than attempting to calculate value for activities in these tithing churches, this study attempts to establish the value of contributions to the ‘mainstream churches’ which between them enjoy the support of some 80% of the population. This will, of course, result in an under-estimate of the total value of contributions to the churches.⁵

The Organisation of Mainstream Churches

The major denominations have central offices in Apia which coordinate and manage their affairs and provide a range of centralised services such as financial management, church record maintenance, religious presses, the management of church education systems and theological training institutions, and the production of instructional material. These denominations, in turn, divide the nation into a series of districts, or *pulega*, which correspond loosely with traditional political districts. These districts exist primarily for administrative purposes and only assume practical significance at certain times of the year as we will show below. Each of these districts in turn comprises a series of village-based congregations, or ‘*aulotu*. For most people, for most of the year, religious activity focuses on the village congregation in which they worship.

The Elements of Contributions to the Church

People contribute, time, labour, food and cash to the village churches with which they identify, and derive various forms of spiritual and social satisfaction from membership and from participation in the religious and social activity which occurs in these congregations. The first set, of fortnightly contributions in cash, labour and kind, provide for the basic maintenance of the village pastor and his family. A second set, of annual contributions, are made through committees which manage the congregations’ affairs, to the development of the village-owned properties which the pastors use, and to the work of the national churches in Samoa and abroad. A third set of ‘extraordinary’ contributions are made to periodic church-sponsored rebuilding projects. Each of these is detailed below.

Basic Maintenance

Each ‘mainstream congregation’ provides the following cash and services to their pastor:

- a regular fortnightly offertory (*alofa*) for the pastor’s use which is not taxed;
- a residence for which no rent is charged⁶ and on which no fringe benefit tax is payable;
- land on which pastors can grow food crops, and labour to tend them, on which no fringe benefit tax is payable;
- a labour contribution to the pastor’s household;
- a contribution to the pastors’ household’s food;
- payment of pastors’ utility and fuel bills;
- occasional ‘gifts’ for the provision of a range of religious services.⁷

No formal minima or maxima are set for any of these contributions, but competition between families (*matāfale*) within village congregations ensures that both total and relative amounts remain more or less stable over time.⁸

Annual Gifts

Congregations make periodic gifts to the church as part of regular cycles of giving. These include the following: contributions to the *Fa’amati*, an annual collection in which a church district defines an item, or home improvement, which congregations are to provide for the comfort and convenience of the pastor and family. The item or improvement is identified and, while no minimum requirements are set, competition between villages to demonstrate their commitment ensures that congregations typically exceed the basic level. The nature and value of the gift is announced to the congregation.

The difficulty with calculation of the value of the *Fa’amati* is that the nature of the specified improvement project varies significantly from one year to the next. Thus, in one year congregations were instructed to purchase bedroom furniture, and in another a motor vehicle. This resulted in one year in expenditure of \$NZ15,000 and one of \$NZ55,000 in the next.

Offerings, *taulaga*, to the *Mē*, an annual collection for the work of the national church, and which includes,

- *taulaga* mo Samoa an offering for church development in Samoa,

³ Villages at one time engaged a *tufuga* or specialist carpenter to direct the project and provided significant amounts of unskilled labour at certain parts of the project. The congregations building churches are increasingly hiring construction companies with more skilled labourers on a commercial basis.

⁴ Village labour is still used at certain times in projects but is not accounted for in great detail as attempts to quantify the value of local labour employed on two projects demonstrated.

⁵ In another version of this paper we will attempt to calculate an amount using data from the 2001 Census.

⁶ This is based on the premise that the congregation foregoes rental income on the dwelling it provides, and that the pastor may derive income from letting his personal residence while he resides in one provided by the village.

⁷ Thus baptism or a copy of a wedding record is nominally free, but people feel compelled to make a ‘gift’ to the pastor which results in a series of small unsolicited gifts.

⁸ Previous years’ figures become benchmarks and become relevant in setting annual ‘goals’.

- *taulaga* o nu'u ese an offering for church missionary work abroad,
- *taluaa* o le 'autaumafai an offering for the work of senior members of congregations who support the activities in the village

These are set on the basis of 'recommended' figures for babies, children, adults and older people, which, in effect, become the minima. Competition between families and villages to demonstrate their commitment ensures that families and congregations typically exceed the basic level.

Occasional Extraordinary Expenditure

Congregations will from time to time decide to rebuild their church buildings, pastors' homes and ancillary buildings. These are extraordinary costs which occur on a longer cycle than either of the regular contributions outlined above. These can be calculated only approximately because while the costs of the various projects are easily enough established, villages do not rebuild these buildings on a regular schedule. The sums invested in these activities will vary considerably for obvious reasons. For instance the Congregational Christian Church of Samoa at Alafua, which has 23 member families, built a new church in September 2004 at a cost of \$441,959 some 24 years after building their first church [Vatau, 2004]; While this expenditure may be significant we have insufficient data at this time to make an estimate of the value of this support.⁹

During a pastor's service, his congregation may choose to support financially the costs of occasional sabbatical and long-service leave, medical treatment, and the weddings, and graduations of pastors' children. Congregations may also decide to provide retirement gifts to long-serving and well-liked pastors. In some cases these have included land, houses, and in some cases both. Other congregations have provided overseas travel at the end of a cleric's service to the village to express their gratitude. The amount which is invested in these activities will vary considerably for obvious reasons, and while this expenditure may be significant we have insufficient data to make an estimate of the value of this support.¹⁰

Calculating the Basic Value of Contributions

To calculate the costs of basic maintenance, a set of data on contributions made by selected congregations in the 'mainstream denominations' was collected. They were derived by identifying a range of village 'types' with different patterns of engagement with the economy. These include villages of different sizes, in different locations and with varying levels of participation in the wage economy, and varying amounts of agricultural land, all of which influence the amount of wealth in the village.

Four village 'types' were identified:

a large, high income urban village in which a high proportion of relatively well-paid urban wage and salary earners resided,
 a medium income peri-urban village in which a number a relatively high proportion of urban wage and salary workers resided,
 a mid-size, medium-income rural village which derived significant parts of its income from commercial agriculture, some from the wages villagers living and working in urban centres and some from remittances from expatriates living abroad,
 a small rural village with very limited land and marine resources which derived income from agriculture, handicraft production, wages from villagers living and working in urban centres and some from remittances from expatriates living abroad

One village of each 'type' was then identified and readily available figures from the representative village types were collected to provide 'surrogate' cases which were then used to compute averages used above as the basis for the national calculation. Two villages were from the Apia Urban area and the Northwest Upolu area, which together account for 40% of the total population and 70% of the country's GDP. Two rural villages were chosen on the bases of size and economic mix.

The range identified was considerable: the *alofa* for instance ranged from SAT700 to SAT8,000 and similar ranges were identified in other categories of expenditure. The range reflected, in part, the villages' demographic profiles and factor endowments, but these variables are to some extent offset by the size of villages' expatriate populations which we could not establish and which will have a profound effect on the amount of cash and goods which are available to the village, and to the church.

A mid-range figure for each of set of expenses was then calculated for this small but representative sample for 2001.¹¹ These were SAT2500¹² per fortnight by way of an *alofa*, to their pastor; the equivalent of a further SAT150 per fortnight to meet their pastor's family's living expenses; 100 hours of labour valued at SAT1.60 per hour¹³ per fortnight and annual gifts of SAT5,000 and SAT10,000 for the *Fa'amati* and the *Mē* respectively.

This figure was multiplied by the number of villages in the country. There are some 362 villages [Government of Western Samoa, 1973] of varying size in Samoa. If each village has at least one mainstream congregation, and if the average costs are multiplied by 362, the basic maintenance of the mainstream denominations costs the Samoan economy in the vicinity of SAT29,843,280 per annum. (See Table 1 below)

Table 1: Estimated Basic Maintenance Costs (SAT)

Category	Fortnightly	Monthly	Annually
Offertory	2500	5000	60,000
Expenses	150	300	3,600
Labour	160	320	3,840

⁹ In a later version of this paper we will develop an estimate for this component of expenditure based on the numbers of churches, built or rebuilt, in a given year.

¹⁰ In a later version of this paper, we will provide data on the range of values of gifts of this type.

¹¹ As this project develops, we will collect a larger data set and refine this admittedly crude measure.

¹² One \$US is approximately 3.00 Samoan tālā (SAT), one \$NZ is about 1.90 Samoan tālā (SAT)

¹³ Based on the average hourly wage at the Yazaki (Samoa) plant, which is the largest employer of labour in Samoa.

Fa'amati			5,000
Mē			10,000
Total (per village)			82,440
Total (330 villages)			29,843,280

These estimates are, we believe, conservative because they:

- assume that each village has a single congregation. Many villages have several 'mainstream' congregations,
- do not include the contributions made by members of tithing churches,
- do not include other significant categories of expenditure which are routinely met by congregations but which, for reasons set out above, are difficult to calculate reliably,
- do not include higher end figures for *Fa'amati* contributions and therefore understate the value of these contributions over time.

Discussion

The Figures in Context

On their own, these figures have limited significance. To provide a context for these some figures for elements of the national economy are provided and the contributions, underestimated though they are, are expressed as a percentage of these. These are provided in Table 2, below.

Table 2: Some Comparisons

Source: ADB Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Country Series

Category	2001 Value (SAT Million)	Contributions as a percentage of
GDP	718.1	3.54
Total Government Revenue	183.8	13.82
Government Tax Revenue	146.5	17.22
Government Non-Tax Revenue	37.3	68.1
Government Surplus	19.8	128.28
Exports (fob)	54.74	46.4

Local Impact of Contributions

Money and time is extracted fortnightly from each of the contributing sections of the church (*matafale*). The cash element is significant because, if families were free to accumulate this income, the resulting savings could be used as evidence of savings history to leverage loans, as collateral for loans, as capital to invest in new projects or micro-enterprises, or working capital with which to finance ongoing micro-enterprises. The time contributed by families to the pastor's household is significant because if families were able to employ this labour on their own projects it is potentially capital generating.

This is then consolidated and given to the pastor for his exclusive use. Because a pastor can not serve in a village to which he 'belongs', he has no property in the village in which to invest, the money is effectively removed from the village economy. The contributions are expended elsewhere in such things as purchase of land, buildings, homes, overseas education for children and occasionally businesses.

Money and energy are also extracted at certain times of the year for the regular cycles of giving. This means that at regular intervals, families have to set aside additional amounts of income which are dedicated to the *Me* and *Fa'amati*. In terms of constraints on capital investment options, this annual giving has the same consequences as regular giving for the *alofa*. Additionally, however, these place additional demands on existing economic activities at these times of the year.

While the *Fa'amati* contributions seem to represent an investment in village-owned capital assets such as the pastor's home and fittings, this is not always the case. While the pastor's house remains the property of the village, many pastors remove furniture and fittings accumulated during their service when they leave the village.

National Impact of Contributions

Neither the income or the fringe benefits which the pastor receives are taxed by the government. This foregone taxation represents a loss of income to the government which has then to be financed from borrowings or loans. It is, therefore, not surprising that the ADB is looking at the status of pastors' income which forms the bulk of the SAT25.4M and that it noted that,

With respect to the tax-free status of ministers of religion, it is not unreasonable for the community to expect that all residents should make a reasonable and equitable contribution to government services. Changing the tax status of ministers of religion would probably meet widespread community resistance, however, and effective consultation with the community would clearly be needed before changes were made. However, the key point is that such matters should be made transparent to the general public so that effective consideration can be given to an appropriate policy. [Asia Development Bank, 1999:xvi]

If a pastor making SAT50,000 per annum was to pay personal income tax at standard tax rates he would contribute SAT10,200 annually in tax, and if all of our notional 362 pastors paid this the government would derive almost an additional SAT3.692 million in revenue.

If a pastor enjoying fringe benefits valued at SAT per annum was to pay fringe benefits at standard rates he would contribute SAT annually in fringe benefit taxes, and if all of our notional 362 pastors paid this the government would derive almost an additional SAT million in revenue.

These calculations are intended only a conservative figure based on standard cost categories which are typically met by all villages. They do not include, for instance, the periodic cost of replacement of church buildings and pastors' accommodation and vehicles and such items as pastors' children's weddings and retirement gifts and allowances which may be paid by some congregations but not others¹⁴. The real figure is probably significantly higher¹⁵ than this one, which is intended only to provide a basic figure to allow us to place this cost in the context of the national economy.

Table 3: Foregone Taxes in Context

Conclusion

The resources consumed by the Christian churches in Samoa are significant. Before out migration commenced, the resources available to churches were constrained by the factor endowments of villages. These natural endowments determined the size of village economies, and how much villages could generate for their churches. This changed dramatically when remittances started to flow back into Samoa from migrants living in metropolitan countries. At that point, the constraints on contributions to churches were effectively dramatically extended. The contributions were then limited only by the willingness of expatriate villagers to continue to support their villages from abroad. The funds remitted to parents and other kin in the village are used to meet their contributions to the church.

Category	1999 Value (SAT Million)	Foregone taxes as a percentage of
GDP	718.1	0.51
Total Government Revenue	183.8	2.01
Government Tax Revenue	146.5	2.52
Government Non-Tax Revenue	37.3	9.90
Government Surplus	19.8	18.65
Exports (fob)	54.74	6.74

The planners in the government have from time to time considered how to persuade the recipients of remittances to employ these significant sums of money in forms of 'development' which are considered more 'productive', or to save these to create a pool of domestic savings which can be made available for other forms of investment. Indeed, there have been some attempts to encourage people to save, but these have been relatively unsuccessful.

The amount of energy, labour, and cash contributed to the churches is effectively withheld from the village and national economy. As long as migrants continue to remit funds to parents and kin who in turn give these to their churches, and as long as churches make no attempt to discourage people from making these contributions, this pattern is not likely to change. Three things may change this pattern.

The first is that the churches themselves may attempt to reform of the existing arrangements and encourage their adherents to reduce the amounts which they give to the church. This seems highly unlikely since there is no obvious reason for them to do this. The second is the possibility that migrants will eventually retire from the metropolitan workforce, and that their overseas-born children will be less likely to remit money to their parents' villages and that the amount of money available for 'discretionary' expenditure on religion will decline. There is already some early evidence that the New Zealand-born children, who have weaker ties and commitments to their parents' villages, are remitting much less to kin in Samoa and that this is done through parents rather than of their own volition. The third is that the policies of tithing churches which effectively limit the proportion of members' incomes which are given to the church to 10 percent, and make donations matters of private conscience, may attract increasing numbers of adherents. The movement of adherents from mainstream churches to tithing denominations could then force the former to modify their expectations and procedures to respond to the loss of their support. Of these, a combination of the second and third seem most likely to produce change. Until then, the very significant amount of resource which the churches currently consume will continue to limit the development options available to both individuals in the village and to the nation.

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¹⁴ In an ordinary rural district in 2001, one village replaced its pastor's accommodation at a cost of SAT81,000 and another replaced its church building at a cost of SAT 957,000.

¹⁵ If, for instance 1%, of the villages replaced their churches annually at a cost of SAT333,000 this figure would rise by SAT1.09 million and if 1% of the villages replaced their pastors' accommodation at SAT80,000 this figure would rise by a further SAT264,000.

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Building Trust and Bridging the Divides: Structural Adjustment and Social Capital in Papua New Guinea

Robert Phillipot, *The Foundation for Development Cooperation*

'Every other time, it is outside forces such as banks, or lenders, or multinationals that are listened to. It is time that a Pacific solution was found for a Pacific problem. If not, the Pacific Meltdown will not be just an economic one, but cultural and social as well.' (Pacific Islands Monthly 1998)

Introduction

This paper discusses why structural adjustment and institutional strengthening has thus far failed to produce the expected benefits in Melanesia and uses Papua New Guinea as a case study. The experience of each country over the past decade is briefly outlined, to show that structural adjustments and institutional strengthening, based on western social and economic concepts, with their emphasis on 'efficiency' have failed to produce the anticipated benefits, and the 'effectiveness' of the state structures is declining. In general, structural adjustment operations are designed to support specific policy changes, and institutional reforms, to achieve the efficient use of resources, and contribute to improvements in the balance of payments, while maintaining economic growth. Here I use the term 'efficiency' to mean that it 'relates to the time and resources required to produce a given outcome; effectiveness relates to the appropriateness of efforts undertaken to the production of desired outcomes' (Grindle 1997: 6). While efficiency may be considered relevant in assessing these programs the focus here is on effectiveness, in terms of national wellbeing and in meeting peoples' real needs. The future outlook for these countries appears bleak, and it is argued here that a major re-appraisal of this approach is urgently required.

Pacific islands culture is diverse, and the region is most often divided into Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia. Melanesia is by far the largest major cultural group accounting for about 75 percent of the total population (Secretariat of the Pacific Community 1998). It is generally recognised that the countries of Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, Vanuatu, and the Fiji Islands constitute Melanesia. The focus of this paper is on PNG. The economies of the Melanesian countries have been well researched over recent years, but the relationship between their economic development strategies, and political and institutional processes, is less well understood. Overall, despite their abundant natural resources, and absence of absolute poverty, these countries have failed to establish themselves on the path to long-term sustainable development. There are many reasons given for this, but frequently it is argued that the inappropriate nature of the institutional structures provided for them at independence has contributed to this. In Melanesia the state is largely a product of the colonial era, as also are many of the public institutions.

Unfortunately the Pacific's experience with structural adjustment and institutional strengthening is fairly recent; hence there is a lack of data on the actual economic and social impacts and the outcomes. PNG has been the subject of a World Bank and IMF Structural Adjustment Program following an economic crisis during 1994, which, amongst other economic effects, produced a major depreciation of the kina. PNG has previously embarked on reform programs (for example the Structural Adjustment Program of the early 1990s, following the closure of the Bougainville Copper Mine, and the adjustment measures during the 1981 reform program) but rarely has it been able to effectively achieve the desired outcomes.

The focus for this paper is the way in which socio-political and cultural factors in Melanesian countries may effect the implementation of structural adjustment programs and in particular institutional strengthening projects. There is a myriad of development constraints faced by these countries but the importance of culture and tradition has been largely ignored. The effectiveness of the typical structural adjustment program is very much dependent upon the effectiveness of the public policy agencies within the implementing government. This is now recognised with the introduction of institutional strengthening. However, generally, institutional strengthening projects focus on the process of increasing the 'capacity of institutions to perform their functions' (OECD 1997: 47). Institutional strengthening is very much about capacity building and organisational structure, but how transferable are institutions? Will an 'effective' organisation in a particular economic and socio-political context necessarily produce the same outcomes in a different context?

Civil Society and Social Capital

During the past two decades social scientists and policy-makers have increasingly referred to both the terms 'civil society' and 'social capital'. One explanation given for this is that in different, but similar ways, the concepts of civil society and social capital each address perceived failings of predominant economic models for explaining the social and political behaviour of individuals and groups within societies. There is a huge amount of literature seeking to define both terms and 'as an analytical concept, civil society and the sectoral models to which it is attached suffer from acute definitional fuzziness' (Edwards and Foley. 1998: 126). The modern use of the term civil society came from the 18th century efforts to create a space for forms of association intermediate between the state and the individual. For example, in his penetrating study of democracy in nineteenth-century North America, de Tocqueville saw the strength of associational life, the proliferation of voluntary associations at the local level, as a fundamental bulwark against potential abuses by an increasingly powerful central authority (Randlall and Theobald 1998: 202). However the more recent revival of the term was in response to the "overgrown" states of the late 20th century (Foley and Edwards. 1998: 7). In particular the disintegration of Soviet-style socialism and the resurgence of civil society in Eastern Europe have revived general interest in the concept of civil society. Generally speaking the characteristic institutions of civil society are the trade unions, professional associations, the independent media and other information sources, and other social and economic groupings which help to integrate different sections of the community with one another. Many users of the term exclude private business, but include business associations such as chambers of commerce. It is generally recognised that a 'healthy' civil society requires that these institutions do not represent mutually exclusive interests or outlooks. In this study the term civil society is used to describe the area between the state, the individual and the market where individuals can form autonomous and group activities of various kinds.

There are generally seen to be essentially two main roles for civil society as it relates to governance and the performance of institutions. Firstly, civil society is seen as a means of strengthening government. It does this by providing interest groups that can effectively

influence the formulation of policy, that can challenge and exert pressure on government to uphold standards of policy implementation and that can act as one of several key checks and balances crucial to the consolidation of strong government. Where this is based on broad participation it is seen to encourage 'values and behaviour' necessary to maintain democratic government institutions. In other words, the contributions of groups and networks of private individuals to public debate helps shape values and standards of behaviour that become so widely accepted that they cannot be ignored, even by the state. Secondly, civil society organisations may act as a complement to government, sometimes performing roles on behalf of government or performing roles that it is better suited to undertake than government.

It is sometimes argued that 'the closer we approach the industrial era, the more civil society expresses itself in highly institutionalised formal organisations such as trade unions, professional associations, independent political parties, pressure groups and other voluntary associations' (Foley and Edwards, 1998: 205). Therefore it is often assumed that less developed societies are much less likely to be characterised by a strong civil society given the importance of 'personalistic patronage style relationships' (Foley and Edwards, 1998: 208). Thus the higher degree of adherence to such things as democratic norms and limits on corruption in industrialised countries than in post colonial states is often explained in terms of a more 'developed' civil society.

As civil society increasingly received attention for its governance role there was more recognition of the role of social capital in facilitating and enhancing civil society. Generally the term 'social capital' is used to refer to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions. Social capital is now generally regarded as important as human capital and natural resources, and 'despite limitations of proxy indicators for social capital, the patterns of results which emerge point to the importance of cross-cutting ties across social groups for engendering co-operation, trust and social and economic well being and better government performance' (Narayan, 1999: 23). Particularly Putnam's work (1993) linked the concepts of civil society and social capital.

Putnam and Institutional Performance

Robert Putnam in *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* sought to explain the reasons for good government performance (Putnam, R. 1993). For his Italian analysis, he used the unique experiment begun in 1970 when Italy created new governments for each of its regions. These regions varied greatly from the standpoint of wealth, social structure and political leanings. The institutional performance of each region was measured by a composite index based on twelve elements, which included promptness in adopting the budget approved by the regional assembly, extent of legislative innovation, provision of day care centres and of family clinics, industrial policy instruments, local health unit expenditures and bureaucratic responsiveness to citizens' queries. The degree of civiness (i.e. level of social capital) in each region is measured by means of quantitative and qualitative indicators; in particular, voter turnout at referenda, and lack of candidate preference voting in political elections, newspaper readership and density of sport and recreation associations.

In Putnam's analysis, the statistical relationship between regional variation in institutional performance and differences in the degree of civiness are found to be more significant than in the case of socio-economic variables. He concluded 'some regions of Italy...are blessed with vibrant networks and norms of civic engagement, while others are cursed with vertically structured politics, a social life of fragmentation and isolation, and a culture of distrust. These differences in civic life turn out to play a key role in explaining institutional success' (Putnam, 1993: 15). Putnam also found that it is not the degree of political participation that distinguishes civic from uncivic regions, but its character. An effective government-citizen relationship is the outcome of successful solutions to dilemmas of collective action. Norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement favour this outcome, because they raise the costs of defection, facilitate information among people, reduce uncertainty and provide models for future cooperation.

However applying the concept of social capital as Putnam does to the regional and national level has raised new issues. In particular it raised the question of whether social capital necessarily has to result in outcomes that are mutually beneficial to all in the region or the nation – that is; must social capital result in common-good outcomes? Recent research tries to address this by distinguishing between 'bonding' and 'bridging' social capital (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 227). Bonding social capital refers to relations among relatively homogenous groups (such as an ethnic, religious or socioeconomic group), and it strengthens the social ties within the particular group. Bridging social capital, on the other hand, refers to relations between heterogeneous groups, and it strengthens ties across such groups. Examples of bridging social capital include the civil rights movement and ecumenical religious organisations.

In particular studies highlight the importance of bridging social capital in societies characterised by considerable ethnic diversity. This is because trust limited within an ethnic group may promote norms of social interaction that are inward looking and less oriented to trust and co-operation at a broader community level (Knack, 1999). Bates, in *Ethnicity, Capital Formation and Conflict*, studies how ethnic fragmentation in Africa affects political institutions, the potential for political violence, economic outcomes, and resistance to political reform (Bates, R. 1999:6). He finds that 'ethnicity is double edged. On the one hand, ethnic groups promote the forces of modernization; phrased more fashionably, they constitute a form of social capital ... On the other hand, ethnic groups organize politically; occasionally they engage in acts of violence, destroying wealth and discouraging the formation of capital. Ethnic groups can thus both generate benefits and inflict costs on societies.' (Bates, R. 1999: 8). Varshney looked at the impact of ethnic bonding, social capital and communal violence in India (Varshney, A. 2001). He argued that more distinction needed to be made between social capital formation within ethnic groups (i.e. 'bonding' social capital) and the form of cross-cutting forms of civic engagement that takes place between groups ('bridging' social capital), and that only the latter is an agent of ethnic peace. According to Varshney, the different effects of the two forms of social capital can explain why some Indian cities have been able maintain Hindu-Muslim peace, whereas other cities suffer endemic violence. Finally a number of studies indicate that a particularly strong focus on group interests can encourage 'rent seeking' behaviour by the group to the disadvantage of the wider community.

Institutions in Melanesia

What kinds of institutions have traditionally maintained social order in Melanesia? Historically Melanesian societies had no formal government as understood in Western terms and this determined the nature of the political leadership, which characterised its society. Rowley explains how the New Guinea village had to maintain itself in a world without imposed order, or protection from state power (Rowley, C.D. 1965: 35). All traditional Melanesian societies are stateless, and the question is how they maintained order without the

elements of state apparatus, which in the Western experience are necessary for orderly social life (Sillitoe, P. 1998: 92). Traditional Melanesian society was based on consensus, gift giving, exchange and obligations. The notion of 'reciprocity' was central, and involves in various forms a complicated, shifting network of reciprocal obligations that continues over time. Such a network can operate on an intra-village or inter-village basis, and involve reciprocal obligations between individuals or groups (Seddon, N. 1995: 2). Reciprocity, commonly illustrated in the exchange of food and gifts, was carried over, as it were, into the realm of external affairs, so that the way to have wrongs redressed was through reciprocal 'pay-back'. Where power was not adequate a common recourse was and still is to sorcery, fear of which may often discourage or limit aggression (Rowley, C.D. 1965: 37). Therefore of most importance for most Melanesians their world was closely prescribed. Generally beyond their own tribe they were surrounded by neighbours perceived to be hostile or suspicious, who often spoke a completely different language. It has been described how traditional life fear of one's enemies and, more importantly, fear of the spirits dominated. The ancestors and spirits of dead relatives were active players in everyday life and great effort and attention went into placating them so as to ward off ill fortune and death.

In Melanesia it was not too difficult to maintain social order with small social groups. The complex exchange institutions, which characterised the stateless societies of Melanesia, promoted orderly political and social relations. The way in which exchange affected such control over behaviour was fairly straightforward. If a society has norms, which members observe and value very highly, that require them to engage in a continuous round of exchanges of valuables with others, then they must remain on amicable terms. They cannot wrong others wantonly (e.g. steal from them) or fight with them and still expect to exchange with them. Their personal reputation and esteem depend upon their participating to the best of their ability (Sillitoe, P. 1998: 93). In Sillitoe's view it is the traditional role of the big man and the exchange-founded interaction in Melanesia that ensured cooperation and social order (Sillitoe, P. 1998:111).

Over recent decades Melanesia has been experiencing a period of rapid transition in terms of social, political and economic relations, generating a transformation from a society characterised by a largely subsistence economy, towards a gradual integration into a predominantly capitalist economy. This transformation has involved the gradual emergence of centralised power structures, both economic and political, which contrast and sometimes conflict with traditional society in which 'local' attitudes were predominant. Initially in Melanesia many leaders believed that under independent governments, traditional values of sharing and redistribution could somehow be reconciled with political and economic development. This was to be done by adapting colonial institutions to make them more culturally appropriate. It was hoped that local control would solve the injustices and distortions of development in the colonial period, and that local knowledge would shape more appropriate development strategies (Schoeffel, P.1997: 6). For example, in PNG it was argued at independence that decentralisation would lead to democratic participation in decision making by devolving power down to the provinces. Clearly since independence this has not been the case but why?

Civil Society and Social Capital in PNG

My research on provinces and social capital in PNG replicated the Putnam methodology but in the context of a developing country and a society which is characterised by extreme ethnic diversity. At the same time provincial government in PNG provided an opportunity to study the role of social capital on essentially nineteen identical government institutions.

In terms of measuring provincial performance the first comprehensive study of districts in PNG was published by Wilson in 1974 (Wilson 1974).¹ However in 1984 the PNG National Planning Office requested the PNG Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research (IASER) to conduct a study on spatial inequalities at the district level. This study attempted to delineate differences in socio-economic development at the district level based on an initial list of 32 indicators (de Albuquerque, K and D'Sa, E. 1986). The social indicators used for the study were derived primarily from the Provincial Data System and the 1980 National Population Census. The indicators were categorised under six main categories: demographic, migration, economic, education, access; and health. A development ranking for the provinces had previously been estimated by the same authors in an earlier analysis of spatial inequalities in PNG. In their 1986 study, the researchers aggregated the district scores to the provincial level revealing a favourable comparison with the earlier preliminary study. Provinces were ranked from 1 to 19 in order of development. The IASER study is still the most comprehensive ranking of provincial performance.

Quantitative indicators of social capital applicable to PNG provinces were identified. Empirical studies differ among themselves in the way they attempt to measure social capital; some have used the density of networks while others have used measures of trust. Others again, have combined a measure of network density with some proxies for assessing the strength of relevant norms. Krishna and Shrader in the *Social Capital Assessment Tool* argue that 'neither an exclusively networks-based nor an entirely norms-dependent measure suffices for scaling social capital.' (Krishna and Shrader 1999:4) Putnam used horizontally organised networks to measure social capital in his Italian analysis, and argued that vertical networks, no matter how dense and no matter how important to its participants, could not sustain social trust and cooperation. (Putnam 1993:173) More recent studies in other countries indicate that 'horizontally shaped networks do not necessarily reveal the presence of higher social capital.' (Krishna and Shrader 1999:7) Because of the enormous uncertainties surrounding this issue, Krishna and Shrader have expressed the view that 'what sorts of norms are associated with which types of networks cannot be assumed in advance but it must be verified independently for each social context' (Krishna and Shrader 1999:8). For this study four indicators were chosen being: education outcomes, the level of community awareness, the number of community-based organisations, and the level of women's participation in local government. The table (refer Appendix) shows the combined correlation coefficients between each of these social capital indicators, and with the provincial development ranking from the IASER analysis

Recent research shows an important relationship between social capital and education. In particular it indicates that social capital is not only a critical input for education, but also a by-product. In addition to strengthening the human capital needed for economic development, social development and state accountability, education seems to foster social capital networks. It seems that social capital is produced through education in three ways: by students practicing social capital skills, such as participation and reciprocity; schools providing forums for community activity; and, through public education students learn how to participate responsibly in their society. It

¹ Following PNG's independence the districts became provinces.

is true that levels of educational attainment are linked to levels of economic development. However, financial resources alone do not guarantee positive educational outcomes for students. Considerable evidence shows that family, community and state involvement in education improves outcomes. Primary schools constitute a centre for social capital in rural areas of PNG. While they are considered to be government institutions the community also funds them in a large part.

School based research in both developed and developing countries indicates that social capital plays an important role in creating effective schools. Francis et al in *Hard Lessons: Primary School, Community and Social Capital in Nigeria* undertook in 1997 a survey of 54 schools and communities across six zones in Nigeria concerning primary school quality and found that school environments were not conducive to learning. The research indicated that trust between parents and teachers, the effectiveness and involvement of the local PTA, and the support and effectiveness of the governmental administration are key components in producing effective schools. It was concluded that the changing relationship between school and community are reflected in the decline of involvement in building educational capacity. (Francis P et al 1998). For PNG the percentage of the population that has completed year 10 at school is used to provide an indicator of the relative levels of 'educational quality' achieved in each province. The statistical relationship between provincial development (the dependent variable) and the quality of education (independent variable) is calculated and the Pearson Correlation is $r = .735$, $p < .01$. This indicates an association between the two variables, or it appears that a higher quality of education is associated with a higher level of development and is statistically significant.² In this case R squared shows that 54 percent of the variance in one variable can be accounted for by the other.

Another indicator of social capital is the community's awareness about current events. The *Papua New Guinea Human Development Report 1998* provides data on communications in PNG because it is argued that it 'plays an essential role in facilitating the process of economic and social development and promoting human development. Modes of communication such as print media, broadcast radio, television, video, postal services and telecommunication services are crucial in the dissemination of information and in linking remote locations to services.' (Government of PNG 1999:128). The most common form of modern communication in PNG is the transistor radio. However, newspaper readership is also an important mode of communication, because of the role it plays in providing wide information and views on issues of community concern. The relationship between provincial development and newspaper readership is $r = .520$, $p < .05$ and which are statistically significant. The similar relationship with radios finds $r = .751$, $p < .01$, and which also is statistically significant. R squared for newspaper readership is 27 percent and for radios it is 56 percent.

The *Papua New Guinea Human Development Report 1998* also highlights the role of village organisations for contributing to a positive social environment, because 'churches and local government councils provide structures for mediating disputes between individuals, clans and tribes to maintain peace and stability within communities. (Government of PNG 1999:47). In particular there is an important role played by community based groups for women. These groups engage in a range of activities that provide income earning opportunities, non-formal skills training, and literacy and awareness training. The number of women's groups is estimated using the number of census units that have women's groups as reported in the Village Services database. (Government of PNG 1999:60). Statistically the relationship between government performance and the density of women's associations for the selected provinces is $r = .705$ and which indicates a fairly strong association. R squared is 50 percent.

The role of women in local level politics may also provide an indication of the stock of social capital in a community. At the national level participation is very low with currently only one woman member of the national parliament. However at the local level women's participation is higher and this can be partly attributed to a requirement in the new Organic Law that requires some women representation. The relationship between provincial development and the number of women in local politics is $r = .481$, $p < .05$, and which is statistically significant. R squared is 23 percent.

In summary across all nineteen provinces the research found a significant relationship between provincial performance and the available indicators of social capital. Subsequently a qualitative study of three selected provinces being Gulf, Eastern Highlands and East New Britain was undertaken. This study found that the role of civil society organisations in Gulf Province, and their interaction with the administration, has been generally very limited. Significant population areas in Gulf receive little or no government services. Largely as a result, churches of various denominations have provided beyond their pastoral responsibilities such as essential services as infrastructure development and maintenance, social services such as health, education and information programs. However beyond the churches there has been minimal involvement of civil society organisations in provincial affairs. Gulf Province is characterised by weak social capital.

In contrast there are a number of large NGOs operating within and from the Eastern Highlands Province. Although Eastern Highlands Province is heavily populated, the people are a less cohesive group than the people in most other parts of the Highlands region because language divisions and the geographical terrain separating language groups appear to impact upon social capital. Recently the Eastern Highlands Province Advisory Committee (EHPAC) was formed by members from all sectors of society, and is chaired by the Governor of Eastern Highlands. The task of the EHPAC is to promote, oversee and coordinate implementation of recommendations put forward through various sectoral working committees, and to promote innovative, collaborative policy approaches to tackle the province's problems. Social capital in the Eastern Highlands has been in decline for at least the past fifteen years, and it will be interesting to see if the EHPAC can reverse this trend.

Civil society organisations in East New Britain Province are dominated by church related organisations such as men and women's fellowship groups, community groups and a few NGOs which are predominantly local. ENB has in the past characterised by relatively strong social capital however this is now coming under significant pressure. In response the Alliance of Community Development Agencies (East New Britain) or the ACDA is an organisation that brings together NGOs, CBOs, church groups, government agencies and other development organisations to work together towards sustaining community development in the Province.

In summary in Gulf, and to a lesser extent in Eastern Highlands, organisations which bring diverse groups together to solve common problems are lacking. In ENBP a broad consensus across ethnic groups, and cooperation between government and civil society, favours effective government. Whereas in Gulf and Eastern Highlands the multiplicity of ethnic groups and a lack of cooperation between government institutions and civil society seems to have frustrated any attempts to maintain a consensus necessary for effective

² The correlation is negative because of the rank order of provinces with the most developed being 1.

government. However contrary to Putnam social capital has not directly influenced the performance of the provincial governments using traditional performance measures.

Conclusion

The Melanesian countries are experiencing very similar problems in trying to establish sustainable economic growth, despite the fact that each has inherited abundant forests, mineral resources and vast ocean resources. Overall these countries have been unable to establish long-term sustainable development. I have argued in this paper that PNG has previously embarked on reform programs (for example the SAP of the early 1990s, following the closure of the Bougainville Copper Mine), but it has been unable to effectively achieve the desired outcomes. Consequently, it is necessary to reassess the applicability of programs of this nature to the particular circumstances in Melanesia.

Critically, the effectiveness of the traditional structural adjustment program is very much dependent upon the effectiveness of the public policy agencies within the implementing government and 'differences in prior conditions and the characteristics of an economy, interacting with the policy changes associated with adjustment, can affect outcomes' (Stewart, P. 1995: 193). Development in PNG has been traditionally dominated by the National and Provincial governments. However the development performance of the provinces cannot be explained purely in terms of the performance of the respective provincial governments. Rather, an examination of the available evidence suggests that the nature of civil society and social capital in PNG has had a much more profound impact on development performance over the longer term.

The qualitative research also suggests that a 'healthy' civil society involve more than just community participation and engagement and the presence of many active groups and organisations. It also requires institutions and processes through which claims can be negotiated and mediated and which organise and structure social interactions. This suggests that government should be decentralized as far as possible to bring decisions to smaller, local jurisdictions, while recognizing and offsetting the potential negative effect of that decentralisation on equality and redistribution.

Development policies, and strategies, in Melanesia need to take into account the specific characteristics of civil society and social capital. In particular, community development is primarily about building relationships and social capital is fundamental to building relationships based on trust, and cooperation. Community development needs to use the civil society organisations that are predominant in the Melanesian context to build "bridging" social capital. The distinction between 'bridging' and 'bonding' social capital is critical in this context. There is a need for governments and civil society to develop processes and suitable structures to better manage their relationships. Public policy should focus on strengthening the 'links' between government institutions and civil society at all levels. Furthermore formal development planning should incorporate the potential role for the participation of civil society organisations in project design and implementation.

Experience shows that to simply get the 'structure right' is not sufficient to ensure that an institution is effective but rather effective institutions and therefore successful reform programs require the active participation of civil society. It is this critical aspect of structural adjustment that has not as yet been adequately researched. There is evidence that this oversight has been a major contributing factor in the apparent failure of structural adjustment in the Melanesian countries.

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Appendix

Table 1: Combined Correlation Coefficients between Social Capital Indicators

Correlations

		DEV RANK	EDUQUAL	WOMENS	NEWS	RADIO	WOMEN
DEV RANK	Pearson Correlation	1.000	.735**	.705	.520*	.751**	.481*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.001	.118	.027	.000	.044
	N	19	18	6	18	18	18
EDUQUAL	Pearson Correlation	.735**	1.000	.801	.543*	.847**	.082
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.	.056	.020	.000	.747
	N	18	18	6	18	18	18
WOMENS	Pearson Correlation	.705	.801	1.000	.229	.899*	.466
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.118	.056	.	.662	.015	.351
	N	6	6	6	6	6	6
NEWS	Pearson Correlation	.520*	.543*	.229	1.000	.565*	.142
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.027	.020	.662	.	.015	.573
	N	18	18	6	18	18	18
RADIO	Pearson Correlation	.751**	.847**	.899*	.565*	1.000	.305
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.015	.015	.	.219
	N	18	18	6	18	18	18
WOMEN	Pearson Correlation	.481*	.082	.466	.142	.305	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.044	.747	.351	.573	.219	.
	N	18	18	6	18	18	18

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Envisioning Future Development Partnerships

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Background

The Rethinking Pacific Education Initiative (RPEI) has, in its short history (2001-2004), taught NZAID and its Pacific partners some valuable lessons on developing capacities for partnerships. Sanga and Nally (2003) have recently documented some examples. Unlike most other projects, the RPEI was initiated by a group of Pacific educational leaders and supported by NZAID. The initiative has focused on addressing educational issues at a very strategic level. The role of NZAID has been to understand and support the initiative, in a hands-off way, allowing Pacific educators to take the lead in exploring education from their particular perspectives.

The RPEI is already rippling out in waves throughout the Pacific. In Vanuatu, Church and provincial groups have begun their own rethinking sessions and research. In Papua New Guinea and Samoa, local researchers have begun undertaking research on indigenous ideas and philosophies. In Tonga, chalk face educators have debated and produced Tongan frameworks for knowledge-creation and are using these to rethink aspects of Tongan education. In the Marshall Islands and its neighbouring Micronesian countries, village elders, government officers, community educators, women leaders and academics have joined forces to establish an Education Commission for Micronesia. Regionally, research and analytical skills are being developed, younger leaders and students are being mentored and experienced Pacific educators are being energized to provide leadership for their communities.

These developments are progressive, given the desire of donors and countries to focus on the grassroots, and the relationship between grassroots communities and policy, research and politics. For NZAID, the Initiative is providing opportunities for the Agency to learn more about what Pacific people *really* think about educational development in their countries. The Agency is keen to link the Initiative to its ongoing work with countries. NZAID can then draw on these combined efforts to better understand and respond to the Pacific's expressed needs, and to ensure that it is supporting the Pacific's leadership of its own education sector.

As stated, both NZAID and Pacific educators have expressed satisfaction about the RPEI. Why has this been the case? What has been energizing about the relationship? What have the partners valued in their relationships? How can these be reproduced in current and future development relationships? Given these experiences, what might development partnerships look like in a decade from now? These questions beg closer scrutiny. They require explanations.

In this paper, we reflected on our experiences of the RPEI to date, in our effort to answer the questions posed. We focused on the positive aspects of the relationships within Pacific countries and with donor partners. Our intention was to use these positive experiences to cast a vision for the future. As individuals, we have been among the key actors in the RPEI. Ruth is the partner on behalf of NZAID and Kabini has been the Pacific project manager. The approach we use in this paper is referred to in the literature as Appreciative Inquiry (AI).

Overview of AI

AI is a philosophy and an approach. As a way of acting and thinking, it 'appreciates' or affirms the best in people, organizations and communities. The basic idea of AI is not new. In brief, AI is based on the assumption that positive change is more likely to come about through affirming the 'best' of 'what is' and envisioning 'what might be' on the basis of proven success. In the general literature, this approach is sometimes referred to as asset-based development, appreciative planning or strength-based approach.

Hammond and Hall (1999: 2-3) state that AI is based on a number of assumptions, as follows:

- In every society, organization or group, something works.
- What we focus on becomes our reality.
- Reality is created in the moment and there are multiple realities.
- The act of asking questions of an organization or group influences the group in some way.
- People have more confidence and comfort to journey to the future (the unknown) when they carry forward parts of the past (known).
- If we carry parts of the past forward, they should be what are best about the past.
- It is important to value differences.
- The language we use creates our reality.

As a strategy, the AI process involves four steps:

- Discover the 'best of what is'--- identify what is working well.
- Dream 'what might be'---envision processes that would work well.
- Design 'what should be'---define and prioritize ideal processes.
- Destiny---create 'what will be'.

According to Hammond (1996), AI is different from the traditional approach to organizational change. In the traditional approach, one would ask, 'what problems are you having around here?' In asking this, one would define the problem, fix what is not working and focus on decay. In AI, the question asked is 'what is working well around here?' In posing this question, one searches for solutions that already exist, amplify what is working and focus on life giving forces.

As explained by Yballe and O'Connor (2000: 475), "AI focuses on the generative potential of positive images...which energize and orient human behavior toward the realization of the ideal." These positive images, according to Cooperrider (1990), are drawn from peoples' accumulated experiences of the best of 'what is'. These are peak moments of heighten success, pride and energy.

AI involves a collaborative process. Watkin and Mohr (2001:14) describe it as a “highly participatory...approach to seeking, identifying and enhancing the ‘life-giving forces’ that are present when a system is performing optimally in human, economic and organizational terms.” In a further explanation, Yballe and O’Connor (2000: 475) state:

After the discovering and valuing of the best here and now, the process moves towards the search for new possibilities, for new arrangements, for new paradigms, and for new processes. Through dialogue, people share different facets of possible realities that have so far resided in their imaginations. Conversations help to facilitate the appreciation and creation of a common image, a common vision of the ideal.

AI has been applied in diverse settings. Finegold, Holland and Lingham (2002) speak of examples where AI has been used to: implement a whole system change at a university, create a coalition of affordable housing and development in a low socio-economic city population, and enable Napal villagers to reclaim ownership of their development competencies and pride. In a more recent case, Kaplan (2004) has described the successful use of AI in a whole system collaboration at World Vision, when more than 20,000 employees in 100 countries participated in strategic planning for the organization. In an example from education, Walker and Carr-Stewart (2004) have used AI to study the work lives of educational leaders.

Our use of AI

In this paper, we use AI in a conversation, to envision future development partnerships.

We asked ourselves these questions to reflect on the NZAID-Pacific educators’ relationship: With an appreciative eye, what, in our opinion, have we valued/appreciated in that relationship? What, in that relationship, has been successful? What has been energizing? What has been esteeming the best of the partners in the relationships?

Our intention was to ‘discover’ the best and the energizing moments of the NZAID-Pacific educators relationship. We used these positive experiences to ‘dream’ and to envision ‘what might be’. We stopped short of designing ‘what should be’ and ‘what will be’ as time did not permit us to do so. We met over several weeks of engaging conversations, during which we reflected, asked each other questions and shared ideas. As well, we kept journal entries of occasions, activities and moments of celebration that we had noted and experienced.

We analysed these positive experiences, using the AI strategy. Additionally, we used Lewin’s (1951) field force analysis technique to explore how positive experiences could be reproduced while minimising negative ones.

In the next section we discuss examples of energizing moments from the RPEI relationship.

Energizing experiences

Pacific peoples taking initiative, showing leadership, driving processes and discussions.

Example 1: In 2002, Vanuatu educators expressed the need to critically reflect on their education system. Under the leadership of John Niroa of the Ministry of Education in Port Vila, a wide cross-section of Ni-Vanuatu people, including villagers, teachers, government officers, community workers and politicians and mobilized themselves in a series of activities to scrutinize their own education. Other Pacific educators then rallied behind their Ni-Vanuatu colleagues to facilitate two research workshops. Teachers, curriculum officers and educational officials learnt to and did research projects. They later presented and debated their papers with others at a national conference. The USP Institute of Pacific Studies has since published some of the papers in the book “Rethinking Vanuatu Education Together”. The conference made numerous recommendations, which have been incorporated into education policy. These activities generated considerable excitement as Vanuatu and Pacific educators learnt from and supported each other. John Niroa and his colleagues used discussion processes that Ni-Vanuatu people were familiar with, in the languages that they speak on a daily basis. Leaders of the RPEI who were involved were pleased with the initiative shown, the processes followed and the positive impacts on everyone. Pacific educators were also pleased with the arms-length support of NZAID. At last, Ni-Vanuatu people had proved to themselves in what they could achieve, themselves, without ‘external experts’.

Example 2: In 2003, a regional conference was held in Nadi, under the auspices of the RPEI. Titled, ‘Rethinking Educational Aid’, the conference was aimed at providing an opportunity wherein Pacific recipients of aid could scrutinize it on the basis of their experiences. The conference was unlike other regional meetings where often Pacific ministers and delegates would not say much or participate as actively because the format and structure of the meetings were not conducive to Pacific debates. Often, at these meetings, observers are left wondering what Pacific delegates who are the real experts may actually be thinking and feeling! What would it be like if Pacific people had a chance to fundamentally drive the processes and discussions? What would education development look like if all barriers to leadership were removed?

Led by Pacific educators, the regional conference used Pacific processes and allowed maximum participation by a wide cross-section of Pacific people. The leadership for education by Pacific peoples could be clearly seen. The ideas were well thought out, insightful and balanced. Again, the environment was positive as Pacific educational leaders facilitated processes that Islanders knew and were comfortable with. Observers were able to see the excitement, and have some hope that the future was in good hands.

Seeing people excited, encouraged, energized and celebrating aspects of the partnerships.

Example 3: At the Nadi conference, it was so refreshing and progressive that Pacific educators and civil society were actually stating their views, without fear of unsettling their relationship with donors. Moreover, Pacific people were talking more than the donors, for once! For non-Pacific participants, it was energizing to be challenged and presented with Pacific partner views – in one sense this helped to ‘even-up’ the relationship. The freedom that was given at the conference seemed to be empowering for the Pacific educators. Key Pacific educational leaders seemed very happy as they expressed their views about matters that had been concerning them for years. It was a particularly special moment for some colleagues to hear educator Professor Konai Thaman say that she was really energized and encouraged by the conference. Often, Pacific educators do express what they really think, during private conversations, but in Nadi,

they were able to state their views publicly. That degree of openness and commitment was really positive. Seeing Pacific educational leaders excited about their work was encouraging for NZAID.

Example 4: During the Wellington launch of the publication, “Rethinking Vanuatu Education Together” in 2004, the Minister of NZAID, Hon. Marion Hobbs spoke passionately about the ‘successful’ demonstrating of a ‘development process’ in the Vanuatu component of the RPEI. In another public presentation in Christchurch a few months later, the Hon. Minister again referred to the RPEI as a successful partnership project for NZAID. At the Wellington book launch, Peter Adams, Executive Director of NZAID also spoke well and sincerely of the RPEI achievements. For Pacific educational leaders of the RPEI, such interests as shown by the Hon. Minister and Peter Adams were really encouraging. The involvement of these senior donor people demonstrated participation and partnership at very strategic levels.

These examples show that partnerships are multi-level and serve purposes that are political, administrative, and developmental as well as educational. The speeches by the Hon. Minister and NZAID CEO showed their genuine interest in and affirmation of the efforts of many people, including Pacific educational leaders and NZAID officials who are involved in the RPEI.

Acknowledging and enjoying mutual relationships, learning and benefits.

Example 5: Generally, Pacific educators feel that current aid relationships represent a one-way paradigm. This paradigm assumes a stance (both overtly and covertly) that the so-called ‘first world’ countries know best, in all areas of development. Experience shows that this is simply not true. Moreover, it is impossible to form an equal partnership (which implies genuine sharing of power and two-way processes) on this basis. The effect in the end (whatever rhetoric is used to the contrary), is that recipients of aid find the one-way paradigm, disempowering. Sometimes it is the covert message which is the most powerful and is the most difficult to challenge.

Conversely, one of the most empowering and developmental things donors could do, would simply be to **recognize the skills that recipient partners already have** – and to explicitly **acknowledge how these can be of benefit to donors as well**. This has happened during some of the RPEI initiatives. Pacific educators had a chance to share, with pride, some of the excellent work they are doing (such as Hilda Lini teaching participants about her Melanesian Institute). When this was happening it gave donor representatives a chance to learn.

When all partners acknowledge and practice a more progressive two-way development paradigm, then recipient partners are enabled to share their unique knowledge and expertise with the partners. When donor partners are prepared to listen and learn from Pacific partners about Pacific education, then it is possible to expect mutual benefits as well.

Example 6: In our reflections, we noted that the collegial nature of the relationships at different levels within the RPEI have been positive and enabling. NZAID officers were seen as sincere and hard working. The RPEI management processes allowed for Pacific educational leaders to regularly talk, strategize and consult about ideas, activities and people with NZAID officials. Over the years, there were times when the two groups agreed and supported each other but also, there were times when they did not see eye to eye in relation to agenda, timelines or procedures. We noted, in our reflections, that even during disagreements, the partners had remained sincerely engaged with each other.

Pacific educational leaders frequently commented on the respect that NZAID officers have shown them, as the educational experts of the Pacific. NZAID officers did not, at anytime, tell their Pacific partners what to do. Instead, NZAID officers would acknowledge the expertise and credibility of Pacific educational leaders and encouraged them to continue playing their leadership roles. Yes, they would suggest an idea, expressed a view, requested for clarification or explained an issue but at no time, did NZAID partners impose an idea or a policy position on Pacific partners’ thinking, vision or activities in the RPEI.

Pacific educational leaders also noted the opportunities provided them by NZAID colleagues to have input into NZAID draft policies or to ‘advise’ on matters of mutual interest. By participating in shaping or influencing NZAID policies, Pacific educators were not just recipients of aid but could also see themselves as stakeholders of NZAID. Consequently, the gap between NZAID and Pacific partners has become narrower and less of a ‘them/us’ situation. Pacific partners have, as a result, moved closer to NZAID and NZAID has also moved closer to Pacific educators.

The discussion above reflects and reiterates the importance of collegial relationships in aid partnerships.

Celebrating success, however small.

Example 7: Celebrations have been integral to the RPEI. We noted, in our reflections, that the occasions of celebrating a particular process, an achievement or activity have been energizing for partners. As a process-oriented initiative, the RPEI saw value in celebrating the journey. Consequently, NZAID officials took the time to celebrate with Pacific partners, even for ‘small’ steps of achievement. When donor officials participated, partners saw this as indicative of their commitment to the vision of the RPEI and the principles under-girding the relationship Pacific educators have with NZAID. For all partners, celebrations reinforced confidence in and mutuality of trust for each other.

Throughout the RPEI, there were numerous moments of celebration. In 2002, Pacific educators rejoiced when they launched the Pacific Education Research Fund. This occasion was a first but pivotal step for research development and capacity building in Pacific education. In 2003, Vanuatu educators celebrated the first time many of them had published their own research work, for their own use. In 2004, Pacific educators and donors alike celebrated the publication of the Vanuatu book in Wellington. In the same year, Micronesian educators celebrated the successful completion of their own conference on ‘Rethinking Micronesian Education’ and the establishment of an education commission for Micronesia. Also in 2002, 2003 and again in 2004, many Pacific students celebrated having presented papers in conferences in Port Vila, Nadi and Majuro.

Taken together, these moments of celebration were energizing for the individuals involved as well as for the partner groups. Celebrations allowed people to reflect with pride and to look forward to the future, being motivated, encouraged and growing in confidence.

Driving forces for the energizing experiences

In the literature on management, Kurt Lewin (1951) has come up with a technique referred to as force field analysis. In this technique, it is assumed that in any change situation, there are both driving and restraining forces. Driving forces are those that push change in a desired direction while restraining ones having the opposite effect. With this in mind, we, the authors, used the basic technique of field force analysis to reflect on the energizing experiences described earlier. Our analysis came up with the following explanations:

Improved communication

When people were clear about their roles or what to expect from the relationships, they were able to take initiative, assume greater responsibility, enhance ownership of ideas and actions and ensure that these were sustainable by themselves. Pacific educational leaders noted that communication was a key part of their relationships with NZAID. Pacific educators were able to come up with ideas and run these by their NZAID colleagues. As partners, they were able to call or e-mail each other freely and, often received immediate responses. They initiated tentative plans, obtained useful feedback, which then allowed improvements of the plans. Among themselves, Pacific educational leaders were also committed to communicating clearly with those in Vanuatu, Marshall Islands or Solomon Islands where activities were taking place. In this way, national educational leaders were made clear of the roles of NZAID, Pacific facilitators of the RPEI and their own responsibilities. Open and clear communication also allowed for disappointments to be expressed and received with attention. In all, energizing experiences were demonstrated by open, frequent, clear and meaningful communications between partners.

Understanding, patience and trust

Understanding refers to the extent to which partners demonstrate empathy, insight and appreciation of a particular phenomenon, situation or people. In aid partnerships, where understanding is present, patience is usually shown to partners. Pacific educators have noted that where NZAID has shown understanding of Pacific peoples and contexts by giving consideration to issues of agenda and process, this has often been positive. Where donor partners 'walk an extra mile' by restraining from acting or leading, even with the best of intentions, this is demonstrable of 'understanding' and patience. Conversely, when Pacific partners meet deadlines and show leadership, these are taken as 'understanding' of the requirements of aid responsibility.

Pacific educators have appreciated the trust demonstrated to them by NZAID colleagues in recognizing their professional autonomy, expertise, and commitment to their communities. One powerful indication of trust has been the commitment by NZAID to refrain from 'doing' or 'taking action'. Instead, what may be considered as NZAID's 'doing' and 'action' have been to support, facilitate and 'let go' of the direction setting and leadership of the RPEI to Pacific educators. The ability of a donor to refrain is an energizing 'action' for recipient partners.

All considered, when better understanding, patience and trust are fostered among partners, the results are positive on their relationships.

Focus on people and processes

The RPEI has been a people-oriented project as opposed to being outcomes-oriented. This has resulted in partners having a sense of freedom to take initiative, learn and act as they saw fit. Because people were deemed to be important, this allowed multiple stakeholders to participate, thereby resulting in a greater sense of involvement and ownership by different people. The focus on people also encouraged the different partners to interact with respect for, interest in and commitment to each other. The focus on processes has meant that people were accorded the time during discussions to be heard and for issues to be dealt with fully, rather than partially or hastily. Attention to process considerations meant that NZAID could be responsive to felt and changing needs rather than being prescriptive. Attention to people and processes acted as a driving force, in that it energized people, embraced them and recognized their contributions and worth. In turn, people were able to participate, lead and remain engaged with other partners in the relationship.

Leadership by Pacific people

Pacific educators have been leaders in all the activities of the RPEI. In playing their roles, they have acted as mentors to their communities, younger colleagues and students. In their leadership, Pacific educators have used Pacific processes and styles of communication, discussion and debate. Leadership by Pacific people in this way is new in development projects. Consequently, this approach has positively impacted Pacific communities, spurring members on to participate and be actively engaged. For NZAID, seeing Pacific people assume leadership has reinforced the agency's own policies and principles. The combined effect of Pacific leadership has been positive for all partners.

Restraining forces against the energizing experiences.

In Kurt Lewin's (1951) technique, restraining forces have a negative effect on the driving forces, thereby, limiting their positive impact. Restraining forces can be attitudinal, financial, technological or human. Again, in our reflections, we, the authors, have identified a number of examples of restraining forces, as follows:

Donor organizational constraints

As an organization, NZAID has systems, structures and processes that, at times, had an inhibiting effect on the relationship with Pacific educators. NZAID could delay or stop an initiative or activity, based on its policies, procedures or timelines. When this happened, Pacific partners were expected to comply and often did. Conversely, organizational practices within recipient countries (such as delayed decisions or poor record keeping), have also been constraining.

This is not to say that organizational structures and bureaucratic requirements are unnecessary but rather, it is to acknowledge that psychologically energizing experiences (such as Pacific people demonstrating leadership, or actively participating and learning) do not flourish within certain bureaucratic cultures. Instead, positive change occurs and flourishes within flexible organizational environments that support innovation, trialing, making mistakes and creating change. In the RPEI experience, some NZAID organizational factors have had a discouraging and stressful effect on Pacific educational leaders.

Pacific partners' indifference

Pacific educators have had a long history of educational aid. Many have genuine reasons for being doubtful about 'new' ideas, people and agendas. Because the RPEI was new in its approach, some key Pacific educational leaders hesitated to participate. Others were cynical about their colleague educators and also questioned the sincerity of NZAID to work with Pacific educators in the new approach. For some educational leaders, this attitude had led to indifference and consequently, minimal participation in some of the activities of the RPEI. Indifference by key educational leaders had a discouraging effect on younger and junior colleagues, and eventually had a negative result on any positive changes that could have been achieved.

Few success stories

In spite of the long history of aid to Pacific education, this experience has, largely not been mutually positive. For Pacific partners, the dismal result has meant that there were few success stories of Pacific people taking initiative and demonstrating leadership of donor funded projects. The RPEI did not have a forerunner to which Pacific educational leaders could 'point to' as a success story. The Initiative was organic. Pacific peoples, using processes and timelines that reflected their realities, drove it. Often these did not fit within NZAID policy and administrative frameworks. Conventionally, when a donor makes an award decision involving finances, it wants to see a 'track record' of success. In the case of the RPEI, there were instances when there were no track records to show for the ideas suggested or actions taken. Pacific educators often saw NZAID insistence for its policies to be followed and its approaches to be used as obstacles. Often, a middle ground was never an option for exploration. The insistence on proven record or to follow familiar grounds had inhibiting impacts on positive change and developmental innovation.

Activities and more activities

From a developmental perspective, much educational work is needed to be done in the countries of the Pacific. The urge to 'do something' is strong, especially when donors have the budget and the political muscle. As well, school needs for reading books, trained teachers and curriculum materials are often pressing and donors, cognizant of international commitments, find it hard to ignore these needs. 'Doing something' is often the speedy response that donors can make. Donors find themselves responding with yet another activity, then another, in a non-reflective way. Little time is accorded to careful scrutiny of activities, their impacts or the changing nature of local contexts. Within a country where multiple donors are engaged, it is easy for donor activities to multiply rapidly. The result is a situation wherein different objectives are pursued for each of the activities at the expense of institutional and national considerations for appropriateness, capacity and sustainability.

The point being made here is that donor goodwill and action are often not enough to meet educational needs within Pacific Islands countries. At times, restraining from 'doing anything' is the more appropriate action. Often times, donor inability to show restraint has stifled Pacific initiatives, innovation and leadership.

Lack of understanding

Aid relationships depend on understandings of partners, their contexts and the assumptions that they have or bring into the relationships. When sincere understanding is absent, ignored or demeaned in relationships, the credibility of the partnership is questioned. When understanding is not reciprocated, the sincerity of the partnership comes into disrepute. In the RPEI, when misunderstandings of policies, procedures, contexts, and worldviews occurred, their effects have often been disheartening.

Linked to poor understanding is the issue of mistrust. Where individuals did not trust each other, it was difficult to work through disagreements, differences of focus, agenda or priority. Where partners have been reluctant to respect each other, it has been difficult to maintain interest, remain engaged with each other or other's issues, or increase one's commitment to a particular issue.

Together, minimal trust and lack of understanding have been discouraging for partners in aid relationships.

What of future partnerships?

Development, as stated, is a journey. Its success, however, is dependent on the partners who are traveling on the journey together. As partners in the RPEI, we are walking this journey. We are interested in improving our partnerships. We aspire to make them better. AI has helped to 'fire up' our own aspirations of future partnerships. These may not represent all the important considerations of successful partnerships. Our suggestions, however, are based on experienced realities, as discussed earlier. From our conversations and reflections; we offer the following 'aspired visions' of future partnerships.

Better understanding

Energizing partnerships of the future are those that give priority to the promotion of better understanding of partners, their contexts, worldviews, underlying rationales and value systems. This will require that capacities for better understanding of people and communities are built, assessed and strengthened. Better understanding of communities begins with according priority attention to communities. Improved appreciation of partners comes by building networks of villages, towns and communities of mind together. Appropriate research is necessary for better understanding. This research must be undertaken, shared, debated and used in policy development or for further research. Cross-cultural training for partners must take place, including experiential re-education. Considerable costs are needed for and must be spent on resources and resourcing for improved understanding. Rewarding of better understanding must take place. Future partnerships will major in the promotion of better understanding of partners and minor in projectization, sectorization, output achievement or building organizational empires. When people are understood, they feel empowered and are more likely to act autonomously, judiciously and fairly.

Trusting relationships

Positive and enabling partnerships of the future are those that establish firm trusting relationships between and among partners. Aid relationships that are based on trust are committed to principles of communication, respect and mutuality. Trust is tested by failures and disappointments. Trust grows when partners remain committed to agreed principles rather than being driven by popular opinion or regulatory requirements. In the Pacific countries, communication includes silences, respectful holding back and circular responses. Donor partners need to learn to 'read' these accurately and appropriately. Trust is also built over time. This requires future partnerships

to be longer-term in nature, allowing for trust and nurturing taking place, using innovative strategies and requiring considerable time and resources. At the level of individuals, key skills for trust building include listening and engaged conversations. Successful future partnerships are those that invest in trust building and –keeping.

Focusing on processes

Authentic partnerships of the future are those that focus on processes and protect the “right relationships”. Processes hold people together through a journey. When people are held together, obstacles seem easier to negotiate. Right relationships are partner and context dependent. It may well be that no two partnership arrangements within a geographical area of the Pacific are the same or follow the same processes. Partners who focus on processes are interested in maturing their relationships. This requires gauging impacts and frequently assessing the nature of the relationship and its processes. Balanced evaluations are necessary rather than one-sided assessments. Moreover, future partnerships must regularly receive independent scrutiny. Successful future partnerships are process-oriented and value the relationship as the development.

Multiple resources

Positively energizing future partnerships consider their resources more broadly than financial contributions. Resources of the future are more likely to be within local communities, not outside them. In the Pacific context, resources include goodwill, community mindedness, hospitality, local knowledge and local leadership. Partnerships must encourage, support and invoke resources that are available from these diverse sources. Energizing future relationships are those that use these multiple resources towards maximum betterment of local communities.

Conducive cultures

Energizing partnerships of the future are those that give priority to creating conducive people cultures, over achievement of objectives and goals. A conducive culture is one that creates opportunities, provides space for stakeholders, guarantees multiple participation and encourages growth for all partners. A conducive culture acknowledges and celebrates creativity and innovation. It is a culture of appropriate but regular feasting, where successes are celebrated and small forward steps are honoured. It is a culture that is biased towards leadership development of partners. Such a culture is integral and indeed fundamental to successful partnerships. A conducive culture is also in turn, the benchmark for partner success. Energizing future partnerships are those that spend resources on creating facilitating cultures for their activities, organizations and relationships.

Conclusion

AI has enabled us to excite our imagination for the future, while standing firmly on actual successful and energizing experiences of our realities. In our conversations and reflections for this paper, we have identified a number of energizing experiences, deemed positive for healthy partnerships. In examining these examples closely, we have drawn out what is needed for these desirable experiences. As well, we have identified the constraining factors that inhibit the positive experiences and their ultimate contributions towards change.

We have envisioned a positive future by suggesting some images for future partnerships. We are heartened by the AI approach; its focus on the positive; on what is working and what is possible for the future. This approach has encouraged us to be hopeful. This hope, however, is based on experienced successes, as opposed to being ideological or premised only on a theoretical foundation. Having experienced successful partnerships in the RPEI, we are confident of building future partnerships that are mutual and beneficial for all, beginning with our vision for the future.

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State, Market and Civil Society in the Pacific: Renegotiating the Balance

Peter Swain, *Volunteer Service Abroad*

Introduction

Over the last decade the term 'civil society' has moved from obscurity to prominence in the discourse on development.

In 1996, when I started my doctoral research on the role of civil society in development in the island nations of the Pacific, leading questions were: what is civil society? Does it have a role in Pacific development? A literature review found few references that related to civil society and development in the Pacific. There was a literature on the emergence of civil society in Eastern Europe, a little from Latin America, a few African and Asian references but almost nothing on the Pacific (Swain 1999).

In 1997 I wrote a paper with John Overton that was presented to the 1997 DevNet Conference in Auckland (Swain & Overton 1999) to set out some preliminary ideas about the role of civil society in development in the Pacific.

Today, seven years later, a web search (CCS 2004, CSI 2004) turns up hundreds of citations, several books, doctoral dissertations and organisations devoted to studying civil society. The term 'civil society' is now a central part of the development discourse. References to civil society can be found throughout Asian Development Bank, World Bank, UNDP and NZAID's publications on Pacific development. (ADB 2004, World Bank 2004, UNDP 2004, NZODA/CID 2000, NZAID 2003, NZAID 2004). Whilst some question the value of the term (Choudry 2002), it is now in common use in the Pacific. At this year's Pacific Forum Leaders Meeting there was a meeting for leaders to dialogue with civil society (SPF 2004, PCF 2004:5).

But are we any clearer about what we mean by civil society, and the role of civil society in development in the Pacific?

In an attempt to answer these questions, I will sketch the history of the phenomenon of civil society, examine the role of civil society in development, and reflect on civil society in the Pacific. Finally I will identify some lessons from my research and their implications for development practice.

A brief history of the idea of civil society

Civil society is at once a simple and complex concept. Simple, in that the term civil society is in common usage; complex, in that the notion of civil society is subject to ambiguity and complexity.

It is helpful to note that the preferred meaning of civil society appears to depend on a writer's theoretical perspective and context. Other terms, such as the third sector (Fernandes 1994:7), the third wave (Huntington 1991), the non-profit sector (Landim 1993:8) and the voluntary sector (Clark 1995), are sometimes used synonymously. For some, civil society is just another word for NGOs.

The discourse on civil society has emerged and submerged, and re-emerged, over the last two hundred years. This discourse has three major themes. The first two themes may be referred to as the liberal and marxian perspectives, a third, post-modern perspective, has emerged in recent years.

Classical Civil Society and the Liberal Tradition

The emergence of the notion of civil society is usually dated to the eighteenth century and attributed to the writings of the Scottish moral philosophers, Adam Ferguson and Aladair MacIntyre, and Adam Smith (Cohen and Arato 1992:98, Gellner 1994:61-80, Keane 1988:35-71). John Locke and the early growth of liberalism were another early influence (Hall 1995:5-6, Tester 1992:7). However, it appears that the concepts and theories of civil society are much older and more complex and may have their origins with pre-Christian Greek philosophers (Giner 1985:33-35, Tester 1992 6-7, McLean 1997).

The Scottish moral philosophers proposed that civil society was a natural condition which led to freedom of the individual from the tyranny of Kings and cousins. This early articulation of civil society is referred to by some as classical civil society, a 'moral or ethical vision ... coterminous with the political realm *in toto*' (Seligman 1992:16-22). Classical civil society was linked with the early development of capitalism, individualism and Protestantism. Seligman notes: 'This idea of the individual, which stands at the core of civil society, was pre-eminently a Christian idea' (1992:66).

Whilst classical civil society had a short life, as an idea for organising society, the emphasis on freedom from state control and liberty has remained a significant influence on the liberal-individualist tradition, particularly in North America. Interestingly, in the United States of America the classic idea of civil society has been revived by neo-liberal advocates of the free market (Crane 1994), social reconstructionists (McLean 1997) and neo-conservative anti-statists (Cohen and Arato 1992:11).

Sinking Civil Society: The Marxian Critique

In Europe, classical notions of civil society did not survive the critiques of Hume, Kant, Hegel and Marx (Tester 1992:26-27). Marx used the idea of civil society as a tool to examine and understand how society works and the relationship between the individual and the state. By making it historical, Marx and Engels argued: 'Civil society as such only develops with the bourgeoisie' and could not be a "natural artifice", as proposed by advocates of classical civil society. According to Marx, 'civil society is basically a terrible lie' as the individualism of civil society, 'puts man against man preventing the community of all men' (cited in Tester 1992:15-18).

Under the attack of Marx, and his inheritors, the discourse on civil society in Europe was submerged for most of the twentieth century, and the debate shifted to the relative merits of different ways of organising the state and the market. Whilst Marx buried the classical notion of civil society, and silenced the discourse for nearly a century, he did show us that the study of civil society is an important means of understanding the nature of society, and in particular the relationship of the individual to the state and the means of production.

Ironically, it was the collapse of states, founded on the Marxian critique of civil society, that led to the revival of the concept of civil society in Eastern Europe (Havel 1997, Gorbachev 1997).

The Re-Emergence of Civil Society

In contrast to classical notions of civil society, there is a developing, post-modern, discourse on re-emerging civil society. This re-emergence of civil society is closely tied to its role in the collapse of authoritarian governments, on both the political left and right, and the process of democratisation of Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cohen and Arato 1992:30-82, Seligman 1993:139-159).

The break up of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the communist states of Eastern Europe has led to a critical re-examination of the relationship between the state, the individual and the market; and the re-emergence of 'The Fragile Ethical Vision of Civil Society' (Seligman 1993:139). In Latin America, after the failure of the revolutionary movements of the 1960s and 1970s, an alliance developed between left-party militants and representatives of civil society.

Some writers (Giner 1985, Gellner 1991, 1994, White 1995) have taken care to separate the idea of civil society from the political system of democracy, pointing out how democratic polities do not necessarily result in civil societies. The term democracy has been co-opted by the neo-liberal right to advocate for the primacy of the market, and by the neo-Marxian left to advocate for the primacy of the state. However, Macdonald (1998) notes: 'The interrelationship of economic liberalisation and democratisation in generating good governance is asserted, but is by no means proven' (1998:26).

As the term civil society has become popularised, and co-opted by both the right and the left of ideological debates, there is some danger that its meaning will become confused and devalued as has happened with the term development (Sachs 1993:1-5, Esteva 1993).

Defining Civil Society

The meaning of civil society depends largely on the context and the relationship of the individual, in their society, to the state and the market. As Lindberg and Sverrisson (1997) note: 'Civil society is, of course, a historical construct and it is manifested differently in different societies' (1997:6).

The manifestations of civil society take the shape of both formal organisations and informal social groupings and practices and may include: neighbourhood associations, non-government organisations, church charities, traditional healing and cultural practices. Wolfe (1989b) captures the diverse nature of civil society, contrasting it against the abstract, impersonal institutions of the state and the market.

Its [civil society] concern is with the social rather than the economic and political. Civil society points towards families, neighbourhoods, voluntary organisations, unions, and spontaneous grassroots movements all of those units of social organisation defined by the fact that they are surrounded by even bigger and more abstract institutions. The crucial characteristic of civil society is that it is manageable, available to ordinary people, part of everyday life. To talk of civil society is to reverse the priorities of political economy. It is to assert that human beings and their desires can alter otherwise determinant structures (1989b:211)

In the context of the island nations of the Pacific, civil society has manifested itself in a variety of forms shaped by particular historical, social and cultural circumstances. Civil society, in the form of traditional forms of mutual assistance, has a long and, in many places, undisturbed history in the Pacific islands. Other segments of civil society including churches, non-government organisations and social movements have a shorter history in the Pacific.

The term civil society did not feature in the development literature until the late 1980s and early 1990s. This was because the early writing on the development project was mainly from the modernisation and underdevelopment schools of thought which both favoured economic, nationalist, statist perspectives. The popularity of the term civil society grew out of the writings of Eastern European intellectuals (Cohen and Arato 1992, Havel 1992, 1997) who were involved in the social movements in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Russia and other former Soviet states which led to the collapse of state socialism (Cohen and Arato 1992:31-36). At the same time as European writing and social action based, in part, on the notion of civil society emerged in the late 1980s, writers and social activists in Latin America (Oxhorn 1995:250-275), Asia (Kothari 1996:11), Africa (Ndegwa 1996:2-8) rediscovered civil society.

It is noteworthy that the re-emergence of the discourse on civil society coincided with the rise of the globalisation project in the 1980s and the rise of the third wave of politicised, indigenous non-government organisations. Globalisation has given us the transnational corporation but it has also brought us global civil society, networks of citizens, NGOs and worldwide social movements.

Civil Society and Development

Wolfe (1990) suggests the three worlds of development (the first world of advanced capitalism, the second world of state socialism and the third world of developing countries), as defined by Horowitz (1966), no longer exist. He talks of the market, the state and the third sector (civil society) as 'the new trinity' (1990:17). In Wolfe's view, development theory and practice has been dominated by political economy, the area of study where states and markets meet. Economics and Political Science have been, and remain, the key disciplines of development. Wolfe argues that Sociology has been neglected in Development Studies but 'ought to be the guilty conscience of Economics and Politics' (1989a:211). This criticism is echoed by Asian (ANGOC 1993), African (Porter et al. 1991, Ndegwa 1996) and Latin American (Fernandes 1994) writers who point out the unsustainability of the dominant development paradigm.

Wolfe (1989a) sees moral obligation as the critical factor in the development discourse. The individualist moral code of the market and the collective moral code of the state are both seen by Wolfe as simplistic and operating from a similar logic: 'Market and state share similar logics, and often with similar results. Neither speak well of obligations to other people simply as people, treating them instead as citizens or opportunities. Neither wish to recognise that people are capable of participating in the making of their own moral rules.' (1989a:12)

On the other hand civil society forces us to think about people and our obligations to each other. Wolfe outlines the dilemmas of being modern where we are free from ties of community and tradition and live instead with forms of regulation that are formal, specified and impersonal. This is in contrast to traditional (moral) societies living with common cultural values and strongly inscribed traditions that

effectively denied democracy, individualism, self-development and equality. 'In short one could have either individual rights without binding moral codes or binding moral codes without individual rights' (1989a:21).

A dilemma is faced by individuals in developing countries, who stand to lose their culture, community and self-reliance (Rist 1997:123-139) if they become modern, for it is difficult to maintain traditional obligations whilst living in the modern world. Modernisation theorists, (for example Lewis 1955 and Rostow 1960) who advocate leaving tradition behind, reinforce this view. Wolfe suggests civil society can help in the resolution of the dilemma of being modern:

The contribution that civil society can make to development is thus one of finding a path between what is given to us by circumstances of time, place and culture and what we are capable of doing with those limits by the powers of social cooperation and choice. To incorporate a civil society perspective into development theory is to raise the question of how to balance the properties of the kind of world out of which one is developing with the properties of the kind of world which one wishes to develop (1990:26)

Watts (1995) is another critic of modernisation who charts the emergence of civil society in the development discourse and identifies its re-emergence with globalisation. During the 1960s and 1970s, when there was little questioning of the dominant development paradigm, Watts noted a 'minor attention to the role of civil society' (1995:58). This was all to change during the 1980s with the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe, the mounting criticism of modernisation theory and the failure of many third world development projects. Watts noted:

By the 1990s, the convergence around social institutions, not the least the fascination with non-governmental organisations, citizenship and human rights, provides an opportunity to design, in the 'new' context of globalised markets and the re-emergence of civil society, new configurations of state, markets and civil organisations unencumbered by outmoded or ideological notions of central planning or unhindered free markets. What is so striking in this confluence of analytic is the centrality of civil society: markets have to be socially embedded, economic dynamism demands social capital, economies are built around trust, obligation, accountability. (1995:58)

With the crisis of development in the 1990s, and the emergence of the alternatives to development paradigm, civil society has become an important focus of current development theory and practice.

Development is facing increasing criticism leading to what Watts sees as a crisis in development (1995:44-47). He argues that this crisis is intrinsic to development itself. To work through the development impasse, Watts suggests:

A key question might be to explore how the current impasse, the effort to reinvent development, is distinctive, a distinctiveness that I shall argue resides not in the existence of post-modern alternatives to development ... but in the confluence around civil society as the way out of development gridlock (1995:47)

Echoing Watts, Lindberg and Sverrisson (1997) argue that the role of social movements in the construction of civil society is central to resolving the development impasse. Referring to Africa, they suggest for development: 'the historic task ...today is ...the creation of a civil society distinct from the state, and a space for independent class and/or interest organisations which can voice the concerns of the people to the rulers of the day.' (1997:15)

Civil Society in the Pacific - Case Studies

During my work in the Pacific over the last fifteen years, I have seen, and been involved in, a range of development programmes that have made contributions to improving the quality of life of people and communities in the Pacific Islands (Swain 1999, 2002, 2004, 2004a). A common factor of these programmes was that they were not primarily state-led or market-driven. Rather, they tapped the energy and creativity of local people to shape the future of their own communities.

The contribution of local Pacific Island communities to their own social and economic development is significant, but the participation of citizens, individually and collectively, in the development of their communities and nations has often been ignored.

During 1997 and 1998, as part of my doctoral research, I undertook three case studies in which segments of civil society were examined *in situ*. A village community in Samoa, a non-government organisation in the Solomon Islands and a Pacific-wide social movement were examined. I have written about these case studies elsewhere (see Swain 1999, Swain 2000). In this paper I will present a brief case study of Volunteer Service Abroad's Pacific Programme, before discussing the findings from these four case studies.

Volunteer Service Abroad's Pacific Programme

Volunteer Service Abroad is New Zealand's largest international volunteer sending agency. VSA is a non-profit development organisation that operates independently, at the request of partner organisations, and without religious or political bias. VSA volunteers work alongside people in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, assisting communities, organisations and government agencies achieve their development objectives (VSA 2004).

Development objectives of poverty alleviation, meeting basic needs, improving human development indicators, reducing social inequality, establishing gender equity, ensuring environmental sustainability, and the development strategies of participation, partnership, empowerment of indigenous communities and people-centred approaches to development have characterised the thought and practice of VSA.

Volunteer Service Abroad's Pacific Programme aims to contribute to the sustainable development of Pacific Islands nations through working in partnership with Pacific peoples and communities (Swain 2002).

VSA's Pacific Programme addresses specific development needs, that have been identified in consultation with national governments, local communities and partner organisations. Because development occurs in the context of relationships between people, communities and nations, VSA aims to establish and maintain productive working relationships with Pacific Island communities, government agencies, NGOs, donors and other partners in New Zealand and throughout the Pacific Region.

VSA's Pacific Programme has developed clusters of related assignments in high priority areas, and sectors, to build the capacity of indigenous organisations to shape the social and economic development of their communities.

VSA's Pacific Programme has focussed on two specific development strategies, skills exchange and capacity building. Assigning volunteers, from a New Zealand, to work as counterparts to transfer specific skills to local workers in a developing nation with the purpose of building the capacity of a particular organisation, is the principal development strategy employed by VSA. The volunteer assignment is the mechanism used.

At the heart of VSA's philosophy lies the belief that development assistance works best when local communities and partner organisations set their own development objectives and determine the type of assistance required to achieve them. It is in these areas that VSA volunteers contribute, transferring their skills, experience and energy to strengthen local capacity to solve local problems.

VSA's programme in the Pacific may be seen as a series of partnerships: Citizen to Citizen, Civil Society to Civil Society, Nation to Nation.

Local ownership of development programmes is critical, but 'outsiders', such as VSA volunteers, can have an important role to play. VSA volunteers do not set themselves aside from their local community. They live in housing similar to local people, buy their food at the local market or store, learn the local language and work to build relationships with members of the local community. The impact of the simple act of volunteers living in community, day-to-day, is an important factor in VSA's approach to development.

Lessons from Case Studies

My research set out to examine the role of civil society in development in the island nations of the Pacific. The four case studies demonstrate that civil society contributes to development in ways that the state and the market could not. However, to promote civil society as the new paradigm for development, ahead of the state and the market, would be to ignore the valid, though problematic, roles of the state and the market in development.

Development in Pacific Island nations has been dominated by the state. Newly independent nation states in the Pacific have almost universally attempted to modernise traditional societies, reform agricultural practices, extract natural resources and industrialise island economies. State-driven development has led to a range of social, economic and environmental problems (Laban & Swain 1996:8, SPREP 1992:219-224, Borugu 1995:16).

One lesson from the experience of state socialism in Eastern Europe is that the state was not sufficient in itself to establish a good society. State dominance led, in many cases, to totalitarian regimes. The collapse of the socialist states in Eastern Europe resulted in (or was triggered by) the (re)emergence of civil society and the growth of markets. A similar lesson can be taken from the failure of autocratic states in Latin America and Africa.

Fukuyama (1992) sees the failure of statist approaches to government supporting his 'End of History' argument. He argues that 'democratic capitalism, in the context of an economically developed, civil society is the best political system, and while it may not take hold everywhere, people will be happiest where it does' (in Kaplan 1996: 378). Fukuyama's view that democratic capitalism is the end point of the struggle between socialism and capitalism is problematic and appears to be an argument for the triumph of the Right that attempts to provide another universalist solution to the organisation of a complex world.

Market-driven development has a shorter history than state dominance in the Pacific Islands but it is also proving problematic (Winkler 1982:67). Whilst some of the resource-rich nations have developed profitable businesses, most Pacific Island economies are very small and many families rely on subsistence gardening and fishing to meet their daily needs. The government sector is often the largest employer, many Pacific Island nations are aid dependent and the people rely on remittances from family members overseas for cash (Bertram & Watters 1985). Furthermore, the distance to markets and expense of transport ensures that perishable island products are rarely profitable. The development of a strong market economy throughout the Pacific has yet to be realised (Macpherson and Macpherson 1998).

Some theorists see civil society as the third way and an alternative to the problematic first way of free-market capitalism and the discredited second way of state socialism (Giddens 1998, Wolfe 1989a). It could be argued that civil society represents a new paradigm for development. However, it is the writer's conclusion that state, market and civil society all have a contribution to make to the social and economic development of a nation and that no one sector is sufficient in itself. The balanced and effective development of Pacific Island nations requires the state, the market and civil society each to play their respective roles, despite their sometimes conflict-ridden relationships.

In the search for development, neither the state nor the market have had the final word and it is doubtful that civil society alone is the solution. In Smillie's words:

Development is a product of many things: good education, effective health and welfare services, good and open government, environmental sustainability, high rates of saving and investment, a dynamic private sector, a vibrant civil society and a healthy trading regime. (1995:20)

Implications For Development Practice

A number of conclusions can be drawn about this research on the role of civil society in development in the Pacific Islands. This paper concludes with three lessons for development practice.

The first lesson is that civil society needs to assume a higher priority in development planning and practice in the Pacific Islands. There is an increasing acknowledgment of the importance of the valuable contribution of civil society to the economic and social development

of a nation, by governments and development organisations (NZAID 2004a:4). However, national development plans, and other development planning documents, often read as though the public services, and the market, are the only available agencies for organising development. Including a requirement in national development plans to examine the potential for civil society institutions (both formal and informal) to undertake development projects would be one mechanism to raise the profile of civil society and acknowledge its role in development.

Development practice must engage the community. Participation in all phases of development programmes creates a vibrant civil society. There are development tasks that the state currently undertakes which could easily be carried out by civil society institutions. Non-government organisations, women's, youth, church and other community groups have a particular contribution to make in the Pacific in this regard. In the past, the usual practice has been to set up a state organisation, or seek to contract an existing business, to undertake new activities. Civil society organisations represent a viable alternative.

Traditional forms of mutual assistance, such as the *fa'asamoa* in Samoa, the *wantok* system throughout Melanesia, *vaka i taukei* in Fiji, *te katei ni Kiribati* in Kiribati and others throughout the Pacific Islands, have a particular contribution to make to development in the their respective domains. The employment of traditional forms of conflict resolution in Bougainville and Solomon Islands (Swain 2004) are good examples. Directly supporting civil society organisations to undertake development projects that extend food security or assist in disaster relief, strengthens these communities, enhances their skills and ensures that the local community 'owns' a particular endeavour.

The second lesson for development practice is that of context. There is not one way to practice development. Different contexts require different approaches to development. A particular social, economic, cultural, political and geographical terrain requires development practice that is appropriate and sensitive to that terrain.

Development practice that values local knowledge, and facilitates an indigenous epistemology, is an aspect of a contextual approach to development. The participation of indigenous people, on their own terms, is central to good development practice (Gegeo 1998:289-315). Local knowledge and an indigenous epistemology have recently been recognised as important, but are treated by most development practitioners as peripheral matters (Dakuvula 1992). Western-orientated development is wedded to a western notion of progress that has eurocentric, racist overtones. For Pacific nations to have development practice that leads to good change for local people, the notion of progress must be de-constructed and an indigenous epistemology understood, valued and promoted.

A third lesson for development practice is the need for the state, the market and civil society to develop processes and structures for negotiating their relationships. These relationships have proven to be problematic, conflict-ridden and often just misunderstood. Development practitioners, public servants, NGO workers, and others involved in development programmes, would benefit from an informed dialogue about this tripartite relationship. The recent South Pacific Forum Leaders dialogue with civil society was a good start. Training potential leaders of development projects in facilitative, participatory development processes would also assist improving relationships, and recruiting local people, who have the experience, knowledge and skills to operate in the three sectors, would be a further advance.

Control of development projects, including financial responsibility, is perhaps the greatest contributor to poor state-market-civil society relationships. This centralisation of power is a product of the top-down, centralised approach to development planning, which has dominated development practice in the Pacific Islands, and is the antithesis of empowering, pluralistic, participatory and people-centred development practice. Emphasising that development practitioners are the servants of the people, rather than the masters of development, is one way of reversing priorities. According civil society an important role in development, and establishing a good working relationship with government agencies and local business that is based on mutual respect, is not an idealistic dream but an achievable objective.

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Hearing the Developing Voice in the WTO: The Role of Civil Society in the WTO's Dispute Settlement Process

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Introduction

The World Trade Organisation ('WTO') is frequently under fire from civil society groups that criticise its lack of responsiveness on issues such as globalisation, sustainable development and the environment. This paper examines one specific area in which the WTO has caused controversy and intense debate regarding its treatment of nongovernmental organisations – the submission of *amicus curiae* briefs pursuant to the WTO's dispute settlement system. *Amicus curiae* briefs are written submissions by parties such as NGOs that are not directly involved in the dispute, but which nonetheless wish to present evidence or interpretations of points of law. In the WTO system, *amicus* briefs represent a powerful mechanism for NGOs to communicate their views, but they are controversial because of their potential to complicate an already resource-intensive process, and because of the ambiguous legal basis for their acceptance.

This paper attempts to examine and ultimately reconcile the perspectives of both NGOs and developing countries on the issue of *amicus* briefs. Particular emphasis is given to the legal foundation for the submission of *amicus* briefs to the Panel stage of dispute settlement. While accepting the difficulties that *amicus* briefs present for developing states, this paper argues that developing states should accept the inevitability of *amicus* briefs and actively embrace them as a strategic tool in their own disputes. Similarly, development-oriented NGOs should also embrace the mechanism as a means of having their opinions heard in the WTO.

Legal Obstacles to Civil Society Involvement in the WTO

From a legal perspective, it is clear that the WTO is an organisation comprised solely of Member States. This is clear from documents such as the 1994 *Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization* ("the Marrakech Agreement"), which indicates that the WTO's purpose is to provide regulatory infrastructure for trade amongst its members and that only governmental organisations are eligible for membership. For example, Article XII of the Marrakech Agreement makes provision for membership by "[a]ny State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations."

The Marrakech Agreement is similarly clear in relation to the position of non-state organizations in Article V, which deals with the WTO's relationship with other intergovernmental organisations and NGOs. While that article requires that the WTO has an obligation (indicated by the word 'shall' in the text) to ensure cooperation with intergovernmental organisations sharing similar areas of responsibility, there are no such obligations in relation to NGOs. Instead, the same article simply states that the WTO "may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO" (emphasis added).

Consequently, the WTO has made formal arrangements to accord observer status to intergovernmental organisations such as the World Bank, the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Food and Agriculture Organization, and issued a document entitled *Guidelines on Observer Status for International Organizations* (WTO Document WT/L/161, Annex 3), outlining the rights and obligations of these organisations. In contrast, the *Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations* (WTO Document WT/L/162) simply encourages the dissemination of information about the WTO's processes to NGOs and does not approach the issue of NGO involvement from the perspective of rights or obligations. While the WTO's engagement with NGOs has undoubtedly increased, for example through dedicated NGO fora during the Ministerial Meetings in Cancun, these processes depend on the goodwill of the WTO, and there are no legally-entrenched rights from which NGOs can demand their inclusion. As Umbricht observes, "[t]he question ... is essentially a problem of transparency entailing a high degree of constitutional significance" (2001: 773 at 773).

A Thumbnail Sketch of Dispute Settlement in the WTO

Before further examining the position of developed countries with regard to *amicus* briefs, it is first useful to outline the nature of the WTO dispute process, as prescribed by the *Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes* ("the DSU").

The process envisaged by the DSU is strictly timetabled, with most cases being resolved within 15 months of their commencement. Figure 1 below offers a simplified, diagrammatic overview of the process

Figure 1: Simplified version of the dispute settlement process

